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 In the following papers I propose to construct economic models that incorporate 
the disastrous effect of conﬂict. I model conﬂict theoretically in a Solow growth model 
and empirically in a GDP per worker growth model, in a civil war onset model and a 
model for civil war’s severity.  
The ﬁrst chapter theoretically and empirically analyzes economic growth with 
conﬂict in the context of the Mankiw et al. (1992) adaptation of the Solow growth model 
and the natural resource growth model by Sachs and Warner (1995). I incorporate a 
variable of capital destruction in the physical and human capital accumulation equations 
and derive coherent theoretical and empirical results.  
The second chapter considers the onset of civil war across all countries and 
speciﬁc subsamples of countries from 1970 to 2007. The onset of war is modeled using 
economic and ﬁnancial variables in addition to grievance variables from the political 
science literature to ascertain the extent to which ﬁnancial crises and hyperinﬂation can 
bring about civil war. I estimate using panel time-series logistic regression techniques 
and discover the risk of conﬂict in Africa, Asia, highly-indebted poor countries, and low 
income countries. Some civil wars are fought for government control and others are 
fought over local issues - both types of war are controlled for with their own 
determinants. 
 ii 
The third chapter determines factors that signiﬁcantly affect the severity of civil 
wars from year to year. I employ the same IV/GMM estimation techniques from Chapter 
1 to discover the role of ﬁnancial crises, hyperinﬂation, unemployment, and 
development assistance and aid in the severity of war. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CAN CONFLICT DIMINISH GROWTH? 
1.1. Introduction 
Does conﬂict diminish growth? Literature in growth and development is silent on 
the matter. However, it seems self-evident that conﬂict can lower GDP per capita by 
lowering capital and labor. Conﬂict’s disastrous effects are highlighted by experiences in 
select countries: 
For instance, in Figure 1 the Rwandan civil war began in 1990 and culminated in 
the genocide of as many as 800,000 people in 1994, but the economy did recover and 
GDP per worker rose to its antebellum level almost a decade later. In Figure 2, the 
ongoing Mexican drug war began in 2006 and resulted in at least 60,000 casualties, but 
the Mexican economy is still recovering. The recent conﬂict in Ukraine, though the death 
toll is small, is a drain on the country’s resources which could be used to aid an already 
struggling economy. However, unlike the ﬁrst two examples, the lasting effects of 
conﬂict on Ukraine’s economy are still unknown. How will this conﬂict affect the 
productivity of the common working person in the short and long-run? We investigate 
precisely this effect. 
Growth regressions do not typically include these destructive effects of war1. One 
exception is the work by Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) which investigates GDP 
per worker growth averages using independent variables of population growth, a central 
                                            
1 Barro (1989) 
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government’s balanced budget, trade openness, investment, and interstate and 
intrastate conﬂict variables. The regressions are based on Sachs and Warner (1995) 
which augments standard Barro (1989) regressions to focus on the effect of natural 
resources. 
Another way of doing growth empirics follows the approach by Mankiw et al. 
(1992). The Solow growth model is built on a production function of capital and labor to 
measure levels of gross domestic product. Mankiw et al. (1992) introduce human capital 
to the Solow model and ﬁnd that human capital growth explains a great deal more of 
GDP variation than physical capital growth. It is from this approach that we measure 
how much conﬂict affects GDP per worker. 
Beyond the empirical work in Polachek and Sevastianova (2010), very little 
empirical economic research into conﬂict exists. There are many different theories of 
conﬂict which are modeled in the context of game theory, but as Murdoch and Sandler 
(2002) write in their survey of empirical work related to civil war, there is a need for 
more “quantitative analysis to distinguish between theories”. The problem is that there 
exists little theory of the effect of conﬂict on growth, as conﬂict theory usually looks at 
determinants of conﬂict2. 
To look at the relationship of conﬂict and growth we construct growth models 
similar to Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) and Mankiw et al. (1992) and introduce 
civil war and interstate war over short and long periods. The ﬁrst group estimation is 
panel time-series in a generalized method of moments and instrumental variables 
                                            
2 For instance, Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Lacina (2006) and 
Elbadawi (1999) determine the onset and severity of civil war. 
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framework, an expansion of more general empirical methods in Polachek and 
Sevastianova (2010). In the second estimation, we model GDP per worker with shares 
of investment, population growth, and conﬂict based on Mankiw et al. (1992). The ﬁrst 
estimation is done as a point of comparison to estimation in ordinary least squares from 
Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) and to determine which type of conﬂict, interstate or 
intrastate, has a short and long-run effect. The second estimation determines how 
important conﬂict is in determining a worker’s typical standard of living. 
The results from the ﬁrst group estimation indicate that interstate war, aggression 
across borders, causes a 0.56 percent decrease in GDP per worker per year of conﬂict 
over a 20-year average. This means that a country that has experienced 5 consecutive 
years of interstate conﬂict will have an annual growth rate that is 2.8 percentage points 
less growth than a country that is peaceful. This result must be considered in the 
context of an average growth rate that is between 1 and 2 percent. Separating the data 
by region we notice that Asian and Southeast Asian countries face slightly smaller 
declines in GDP due to civil war. Also, supporting the current conﬂict literature, conﬂict 
is relegated to low and middle-income countries. 
The ﬁrst group estimation is based on the speciﬁcation of Polachek and 
Sevastianova (2010) and is preceded by the theory behind Sachs and Warner (1995), 
an explanation of the data and conﬂict variables, and empirical estimation methods. The 
results are reported by region and income and then ﬁnally as a whole. The second 
group estimation follows with an analysis of Mankiw et al. (1992) and a GDP levels 
estimation with conﬂict. The relationship between low income countries and conﬂict is 
addressed and followed by theory based on the Solow model of growth. Then the paper 
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concludes with data, methods and results for this second group estimation. 
1.2 Literature review 
Two mainstays in the economic conﬂict literature, Skaperdas and Garﬁnkel, draw 
on knowledge of game theory with applications to conﬂict; however, newer research 
empirically analyses the negative economic impact of conflict. Blomberg and Hess 
(2002) considered 152 countries from 1950-1992 and found that economic recessions 
generally promote internal and external conﬂict. They also concluded that the state of 
the economy and conﬂict are dependent on one another. 
Sevastianova (2009) found a strong relationship between levels of GDP and 
conﬂict, but cautioned against using conﬂict with GDP growth. She explains that war 
may actually increase GDP with regards to international war. Polachek and 
Sevastianova (2010) ﬁnd that both inter- and intra-state conﬂict reduce GDP growth, 
and severity matters more than duration of conﬂict. We will see that severity is indeed a 
better measure of conﬂict’s deleterious eﬀect, but the effect seldom appears to 
substantially increase GDP per worker. 
Blattman and Miguel (2010) remind us of the need for better data and a more 
micro-oriented analysis of conﬂict. My analysis involves a macroeconomic perspective 
on conﬂict, but still achieves coherent and signiﬁcant conclusions. Their case of 
analyzing conﬂict on the micro-level is further bolstered by the small effects of conﬂict 
on growth we will see country by country. We know conﬂict has damaging effects, its 
analysis may require more speciﬁc data on a micro-level. Another recent article from 
Nakamura et al. (2013) considers the implications of conﬂict on asset prices. 
Nakamura’s research does not use conﬂict data from the Correlates of War or the 
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Uppsala Conﬂict Database which may further bolster any empirical take on conﬂict. 
Murdoch and Sandler (2002) test a neoclassical growth model with civil war and 
the ensuing spillover effects on neighboring countries. They ﬁnd results similar to 
Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) in which civil war has a strong short-run effect, but 
with collateral damage. They attribute spillover effects to reduced efficiency of 
resources such as a country spending more on military instead of other productive 
activities. Long-term effects of civil war are described as occurring as a result of 
destruction to human capital and forgoing investment. Murdoch and Sandler (2002) also 
echo the sentiments of Blattman and Miguel (2010) in the need for more “quantitative 
analysis to distinguish between theories”. 
Since the dataset includes data from foreign aid recipients we should make 
mention of the relationship between aid and conﬂict. Chauvet (2003) concludes that 
violent instability has a positive effect on aid allocation and hence economic growth, but 
social instability has a negative effect. This suggests that countries which are 
experiencing conﬂict or war may actually receive more aid thus confusing the real 
deleterious effects of war on capital and labor. We contend that negative effects can still 
be seen in GDP growth rates despite the foreign aid inﬂuence. 
The paper from which Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) base their estimation is 
Sachs and Warner (1995) wherein countries with high levels of natural resources are 
found not to experience high levels of economic growth. From this paper we use 
variables of investment, government efficiency, initial per capita incomes, etc. Sachs 
and Warner (1995) use long-run averages of GDP growth which are modiﬁed by 
Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) to include 1-year, 2-year and 5-year averages. In 
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this paper we consider a 10-year growth average as well. These growth regressions are 
also in the spirit of Barro (1989). Barro (1989) ﬁnds inverse relationships between 
growth and government consumption and initial levels of income. He also touches on 
the role of human capital which we will discuss in the speciﬁcation by Mankiw et al. 
(1992). 
Robert Solow’s original growth model includes capital and labor while Mankiw et 
al. (1992) add human capital to better explain GDP per worker growth across countries. 
My second model stays true to Mankiw et al. (1992), though I add conﬂict to the capital 
and human capital accumulation equations. This is explained in greater detail in the 
following sections. 
1.3 GDP per worker growth averages over different time periods via Polachek 
and Sevastianova (2010) 
Generalized method of moments and instrumental variables estimation are 
based on Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) and Sachs and Warner (1995) who 
consider average growth rates covering 1970 to 1990. The Sachs and Warner model of 
1995: 
(ln 𝑌1990 − ln𝑌1971)𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑌1970𝑖 + 𝛽2
′𝑍𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 
Sachs and Warner (1995) use a base year of 1971 and ﬁnd the average growth 
over 20 years. Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) take a more recent dataset and ﬁnd 
variable growth rates. My empirical models are as follows and are analogous to the 
speciﬁcation in Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) with the addition of a 10-year growth 
average: 
(ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ln𝑌𝑖𝑡−𝑗)𝑖 = 𝛽 ln 𝑌0𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖  
7 
 
 
𝑗 = 1, 2, 5, 10, 20 
There is value added to these models by estimating with generalized method of 
moments via Arellano & Bond and instrumental variables. This accomplishes a check to 
the ordinary least squares regression techniques that Polachek and Sevastianova 
(2010) and Sachs and Warner (1995) employ. Y is GDP per worker and Y lagged by j 
years is GDP per worker from a previous period with a host of independent variables, X, 
and conﬂict variables, C, with group and period speciﬁc ﬁxed effects. Sachs and Warner 
estimate with only 90 observations, 1 average growth rate per country. I replicate these 
results and then estimate a panel time-series in OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects. 
1.4 Comprehensive data analysis for ﬁrst group estimation 
 The data for this project come from the Penn World Tables (version 7.1 and 8.0), 
the Correlates of War database (version 4.0), the Sachs and Warner database (1997), 
and the World Development Indicators from the World Bank (2014). The Penn World 
Tables offer several deﬁnitions of gross domestic product, but to simplify estimation, I 
use GDP per employed person using version 7.1. The employment variable from 
version 8.0 has several missing values so I use the version 7.1 variable for better 
estimation eﬃciency. Using this deﬁnition of GDP, I derive 1-year, 5-year, 10-year and 
20-year growth averages which are similar to Polachek’s speciﬁcation from Polachek 
and Sevastianova (2010). 
From the Correlates of War database, I construct variables for war duration 
measured as the cumulative number of years in which a country experiences conﬂict. 
Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) uses a similar construction from the Correlates 
database for the years 1970 to 2000. This domestic war variable will explain not the 
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severity of war, but the cumulative effect of being engaged in conﬂict over one or many 
years. The example in Table 1 with civil war describes how this duration variable is 
accumulated. 
The construction of the duration variable is to show the effect of cumulative 
engagement in conﬂict. The mean of the civil war duration variable is 0.172 years, as 
seen in Table 3, which tells us that any given country experiences about 2 months of 
civil conﬂict per year on average and half a month of interstate conﬂict for the respective 
interstate conﬂict duration variable. 
To measure intensity of conﬂict, I take the variables of interstate and civil war 
battle deaths from the Correlates of War database. For a given year, conﬂict deaths per 
1,000 people is measured for both speciﬁcations. The data is not precise for number of 
deaths occurring each year over time periods longer than 1 year. For example in Bosnia 
& Herzegovina, in Table 2, the conﬂict over a period of three years resulted in 27,500 
casualties. However, the database does not list casualties incurred during the ﬁrst year 
versus the last year of conﬂict, i.e. there is no variation in severity over the length of the 
civil war. 
There are some inherent problems with this since the data collectors do not tally 
precise estimates of war casualties. However, this will still give coherent results and a 
general measure of conﬂict severity. This is one limitation of using a sizable dataset with 
many groups and periods - precise annual estimates of conﬂict have not been recorded 
for a duration longer than 1 year3. 
                                            
3 This is true with the exception of ACLED (Armed Conﬂict Location & Event Data 
Project). 
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Some criticism arises in that we consider GDP per worker, instead of GDP per 
capita. GDP per worker stays true to the original speciﬁcation by Sachs & Warner, 
Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) and Mankiw et al. (1992). As a means of 
comparability of research, keeping GDP per worker will prove valuable and is supported 
by theory. Also, we mustn’t account for deaths to the very young or elderly since they 
don’t signiﬁcantly contribute to GDP. 
1.5 Stationarity vs. non-stationarity 
There is still some dissension in explaining the stationarity of GDP. Nelson and 
Plosser (1982) could not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root and cautioned against 
the use of non-stationary monetary variables in explaining output variations. Aslanidis 
and Fountas (2012) found that only a few countries exhibit real GDP which is stationary 
and that the exchange rate regime has a role. Hegwood and Papell (2006) consider 
structural change when modelling real GDP and conclude it is in fact trend stationary in 
this context. 
We may suspect non-stationarity in GDP per worker, but the test for a 10-year 
growth rate also suggests a unit root. Therefore, in the estimation procedure I difference 
the 10-year growth rates and achieve a desirable solution with signiﬁcant coefficients. 
However, this solution actually yields a lower F-statistic and therefore suggests a poorer 
ﬁt for GDP growth. 
In Table 4, notice that the Maddala & Wu panel unit root test suggests unit roots 
in log GDP per worker and the 10-year GDP per worker growth variable. This procedure 
assumes cross-section independence of the dependent variable, but we may expect 
GDP per worker to be relatable across borders. GDP per worker will tend to rise over 
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time in all countries, however, this does not suggest a dependent relationship between 
countries. 
The Pesaran panel unit root test assumes cross-section dependence, but for the 
reason I just mentioned, we wouldn’t expect GDP growth rates to be related across 
countries except for the fact that they share a general positive trend. In summary, I 
maintain the undifferenced 10-year growth rates which provide a better explanatory 
model. 
1.6 Robustness checks 
An important consideration is whether we should study only countries which have 
experienced conﬂict or all countries as a whole. If we restrict the sample to only 
countries that have felt the effects of conﬂict through simply 25 deaths occurring in a 
year as a result of armed conﬂict, then the coefficients actually become smaller and less 
signiﬁcant in the 1 and 2-year average regressions. In the 5-year and 10-year average 
regressions the coefficients are actually a bit larger, yet still less signiﬁcant. The addition 
of several countries that have 0 values for conﬂict increases the sample size and 
therefore also the signiﬁcance of coefficients. For the purposes of this paper, all 
countries are included in estimation unless otherwise speciﬁed. 
Another issue is the exclusion of certain variables for which there are insufficient 
observations. The measure of central government budget balance, government revenue 
minus government expenditures, limits our sample to 140 countries with an average of 
10.5 years of data per country. Excluding the variable includes 20 more countries in the 
sample with an average of 38.5 years of data per country. The F-statistic also increases 
from 42.01 to 52.74 in the 1-year average regressions using instrumental variables. 
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Thus the ratio of explained variance to unexplained variance without the central 
government budget balance is greater than with its inclusion and hence is a better 
explanatory model for short-run variations in GDP per worker. In the long-run, the 
generalized method of moments estimation ﬁts a better model with the central 
government budget balance. 
Multicollinearity may exist among the conﬂict variables as cumulative battle 
deaths are composed of interstate and civil war fatalities. If explanatory variables are 
related to each other than the coefficient estimates are unreliable and standard error 
estimates are too high. However, this is not the case as the variance inﬂation factors for 
civil war fatalities, interstate war fatalities and cumulative battle deaths are all below 5 
which is the standard measure of degree for collinearity. 
Another point of contention is the division of data into subsamples of income and 
region. Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) check results by region, income level and 
political regime while we only seek results by region and income. Some differences are 
noticeable by region and income; however, the overall conclusions are that conﬂict is a 
low and middle-income problem. 
In Africa, from Tables 10 through 12, the duration of civil war and civil war 
fatalities play signiﬁcant roles in growth. The strongest effects occur in the 10-year 
growth averages with a decline in GDP of 0.238 percent per year of civil war. With a 20-
year average of 1.157 percent growth, this corresponds to signiﬁcant drops to the 
average worker’s well-being as civil war rages on. 
The European story is similar with signiﬁcant eﬀects of civil war fatalities. A 10-
year growth average is hindered by 0.935 percent for every 1,000 people that die in civil 
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conﬂict. Europe does not have any significant trouble with engaging in civil war in so far 
as no one dies and adversely affects the labor supply. High levels of human capital in 
Europe play a role in this context as valuable workers are killed or displaced. 
Civil war has remarkable effects over all time periods in Asian and East Asian 
countries. In Tables 10 through 12, these countries exhibit signiﬁcant 1, 2, and 5-year 
changes in growth of approximately 0.30 percent per year of civil war. Over the same 
time periods, Southeast Asian countries show slight improvements in growth as portions 
of their small labor force are replaced and the economy reorganizes. Interstate conﬂict 
plays a long-run role in Asia, in Table 14, with signiﬁcant declines of 0.716 percent per 
year over a 20-year period. 
Engagement in civil war in South America contributes to percentage changes in 
growth of roughly -0.5 percent per year of civil war over 2, 5, and 10-year periods in 
Tables 11 through 13. Prolonged civil war is always disadvantageous, but more so if 
civil conﬂicts do not resolve after 1 year. Weakening of Africa’s economy occurs in the 
long-run at 10 and 20-year periods of growth. Engaging in civil war is costly to Africa in 
ways similar to South America. 
1.7 Instrumental variables and GMM estimation 
What is generalized method of moments estimation? Many economists are 
familiar with ordinary least squares estimation, but generalized method of moments 
estimation and its special case of instrumental variables estimation are fairly new topics. 
Generalized method of moments is a general estimation technique whereby estimators 
are determined from moment conditions. These moments may be the sample mean or 
variance and are used to estimate unknown parameters. We make assumptions about 
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the distribution of the population, such as that it is normally distributed, and from this 
assumption (and assumptions of the population mean and variance for example) we 
generate the sample moment conditions. 
The number of moment conditions we specify, however, may not necessarily 
equal the number of parameters we wish to estimate and therefore we may not have 
exact solutions. In this case, the number of moment conditions we specify may be 
greater than the number of parameters we wish to ﬁnd. The objective is then to 
minimize the diﬀerences between what we expect our parameters to be and the actual 
population values. GMM is useful in applications for large samples, such as my own, 
where the law of large numbers becomes beneﬁcial. 
Typically the GMM estimation technique via Arellano and Bond (1991) assumes 
limited to no serial correlation of the errors. The Wooldridge test for panel-data models 
from Wooldridge (2001) conﬁrms no autocorrelation thus allowing the possibility of a 
consistent estimator. Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation is also typical with large N 
and small T (in my case, 59 groups and 10 years on average for 2-year, 5-year and 10-
year growth averages). A simple autoregressive speciﬁcation follows (from Arellano and 
Bond (1991)): 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
The Arellano & Bond GMM estimation is included as a point of comparison to the 
instrumental variables, ﬁxed effects regression technique called xtivreg2. I include and 
compare regression results from both speciﬁcations and only report the coefficients of 
interest on the conﬂict variables. This is done for 1-year, 2-year, 5-year and 10-year 
growth rates. 
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The method of IV/GMM estimation labeled “xtivreg2” is similar to the Arellano & 
Bond estimation technique. I chose to instrument the lag of GDP growth with lagged 
consumption prices. We expect correlation with consumption prices and GDP growth, 
but not necessarily with other variables. The improvement over estimation without 
instruments is very small and endogeneity in general shouldn’t pose a signiﬁcant 
problem. Xtivreg2 estimates ﬁxed-effects for panel time-series data and this estimation 
technique differs significantly from Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) in which panel 
ﬁxed-effects estimation with OLS was completed. 
Ordinary least squares is performed on all models and these types of regressions 
do not incorporate within-group variation of independent variables. This was a favored 
technique twenty years ago in growth models when long-period averages were simply 
calculated for each country in the sample. This method works perfectly ﬁne when each 
country has one observation of interest, but panel time-series estimation may require us 
to include inherent differences in each country. Therefore, we include ﬁxed eﬀects 
estimation with group and period-speciﬁc eﬀects to capture the innate differences 
among countries. 
One question may be raised, “Why compare GMM estimation techniques with 
typical IV estimation?” Generalized method of moments estimation can account for 
arbitrary heteroscedasticity within groups - a problem which may arise in 
implementation of instrumental variable estimation. We may suspect some correlation of 
errors within groups, but using both techniques will be useful as a point of comparison. 
There is a tradeoff in efficiency by choosing not to use OLS and we’re allowing for this 
tradeoff. Also, we’re generally searching for some consistency with Polachek and 
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Sevastianova (2010) and conﬂict variables should be able to withstand such a 
comparison. 
1.8 Results 
 In the regression analysis, some variables are omitted due to insigniﬁcance, 
otherwise the regressions are analogous to the speciﬁcation in Polachek and 
Sevastianova (2010). Some of these are variables like measures of polity, institutional 
quality, and government consumption and other conﬂict variables such as militarized 
disputes. The addition of militarized disputes is problematic as the estimations in 
Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) excessively high changes in growth from these key 
variables. The interpretation of MIDs is also not straightforward as the variable is a 
discrete variable measuring the escalation of conﬂict. 
The ﬁrst two columns in Table 5 report results from Sachs & Warner’s original 
dataset and my new dataset with variables that may differ slightly from the original set. 
Several of the key independent variables are actually averages over the time period of 
1970 to 1990 and include 1 observation for each country. The second two columns 
report coefficients for panel time-series estimation in ordinary least squares without 
conﬂict and with conﬂict.  
First, the results in Table 5 bear resemblance to the original. The 20-year growth 
rates are explained by all four conﬂict variables signiﬁcantly. The addition of conﬂict 
yields striking results for countries that engage in long-periods of interstate war - a 
decline in GDP per worker of 0.56 percent over a period of 20-years for each year 
engaged in aggression across borders. For each year of civil war, there is an associated 
decline of 0.067 percent. Every 1,000 people killed by civil war result in loss to GDP of 
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0.029 percent. Once again, the mean of the dependent variable in Table 3 is 1.157 
percent. 
Short-run estimation in Tables 6 and 7 yield negative coefficients on interstate 
war fatalities per 1,000 people. The interpretation of these coeﬃcients is such that a 1-
unit increase in the conﬂict variable causes a percentage change in the dependent 
variable that is equal to the coefficient. Therefore, consecutive years of interstate war 
have a compounding effect on 1-year GDP growth rates. This is because if a country 
experiences 3-years of uninterrupted across the border conﬂict, then the effect on GDP 
growth can be 3-fold. A long-run interstate conﬂict can have lasting effects on annual 
and biennial GDP taking a greater toll with each additional year. 
Growth rates over longer periods of time show the effects of conﬂict quite clearly. 
For the 5-year growth rates in Table 8, civil war duration and interstate fatalities play 
leading roles. Civil war’s devastating eﬀects are greater than interstate war’s effects 
over 5-years. For every year a country is involved in civil war, there is an associated 
decline of about 0.144 percent in gross domestic product per worker. 
Civil war and interstate war duration have roughly equal effects in the economy 
over 10 year periods in Table 9. Interstate war fatalities still play a small role as the 
labor supply is reduced. Overall, we cannot make a judgement on whether civil war or 
interstate war is more damaging, but we do discover some overall trends. Civil war does 
not affect GDP growth in the short run over 1 to 2-year periods. It is a 5 to 20-year 
problem creating lasting effects in an economy. Interstate war has a small effect in the 
short-run and large effect in the long-run. The 20-year growth rate average suffers the 
most from prolonged periods of interstate war engagement. 
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1.9 GDP levels estimation via Mankiw et al. (1992) 
 1.9.1 Introduction 
Mankiw et al. (1992) propose an augmented model of Solow’s neoclassical production 
function of capital and labor. The inclusion of human capital in the production function 
provided more empirical evidence of the Solow theory which explains cross-country 
variations in income per capita. This paper reaffirms Solow’s predictions by updating the 
model with current data and ﬁxed-effects regression techniques. Then, the addition of 
conﬂict into the model provides a framework for analyzing the share of destructive war 
in determining the standard of living. 
Research into conﬂict has often described conﬂict as a low-income country 
problem. This is evident in the scatter diagram in Figure 3 of logged gross domestic 
product per worker over the period 1960 to 2011 and civil war deaths per 1,000 people. 
The severity of war is measured by the number of deaths and we see that extreme 
examples of conﬂict typically occur in low-income countries. The Khmer Rouge in 
Cambodia are responsible for close to 45,000 deaths and the Bosnian civil war of the 
1990s accounts for almost 30,000 deaths. The U.S. was involved in civil war and 
experienced casualties in Vietnam in the early 1960s before the Vietnam War, however, 
these deaths measured in the hundreds. 
There is a clear relationship between economic level of well-being and conﬂict, 
but how much of this well-being is determined by destructive activity? 
1.9.2 Theory 
Mankiw et al. (1992) speciﬁcally address the Solow model of growth with the 
addition of human capital. From this model I introduce conﬂict into the capital and 
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human capital accumulation equations. The literature suggests such capital destruction 
along with labor displacement, but I account for declines in labor through human capital. 
The Mankiw et al. (1992) speciﬁcation is as follows: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐻𝑡
𝛽(𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡)
(1−𝛼−𝛽) 
The basic theoretical model deﬁnes Yt as GDP, Kt as capital, Lt as labor, Ht as 
human capital, and At as the level of technology all at time t. This speciﬁcation differs 
only from the Solow Model in that it includes Ht
β
 as a measure of human capital and 
hence a β is subtracted from the AtLt exponent. The model I propose is identical in this 
respect, yet through the accumulation of capital and human capital, conﬂict has a 
disastrous eﬀect. The capital and human capital accumulation equations are: 
?̇?𝑡 = 𝑠𝐾𝑌𝑡 − 𝛿𝐾𝑡 − 𝑐𝐾𝑡 
?̇?𝑡 = 𝑠𝐻𝑌𝑡 − 𝛿𝐻𝑡 − 𝑐𝐻𝑡 
Mankiw et al. (1992) hypothesize a rate of capital depreciation, δ, at 0.03 and g, 
the growth of technology, at about 0.02. The depreciation of capital due to conﬂict is 
somewhat more difficult to measure. There exists no real, accurate measure of the 
declines in capital due to war. However, we will discover this does not pose a significant 
problem. If we divide (1) by AtLt to get a measure of per worker GDP, capital and 
human capital, then the production function becomes: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡
𝛼ℎ𝑡
𝛽
 
Solving for the change in capital and human capital over time we discover that 
destruction of capital will play a role similar to population growth, technology growth, 
and depreciation: 
?̇?𝑡 = 𝑠𝐾𝑦𝑡 − 𝑘𝑡[𝜂 + 𝑔 + 𝛿 + 𝑐] 
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ℎ̇𝑡 = 𝑠𝐻𝑦𝑡 − ℎ𝑡[𝜂 + 𝑔 + 𝛿 + 𝑐] 
In steady-state, k̇t = ḣt = 0, and we ﬁnd expressions for physical capital and 
human capital, k
*
 and h
*
: 
𝑘∗ =
𝑠𝐾
𝜂 + 𝑔 + 𝛿 + 𝑐
1−𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽 𝑠𝐻
𝜂 + 𝑔 + 𝛿 + 𝑐
𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
 
ℎ∗ =
𝑠𝐻
𝜂 + 𝑔 + 𝛿 + 𝑐
1−𝛼
1−𝛼−𝛽 𝑠𝐾
𝜂 + 𝑔 + 𝛿 + 𝑐
𝛼
1−𝛼−𝛽
 
 
Then solving for y*, the steady-state value of GDP per worker, as a function of 
the right-hand side of equations (7) and (8): 
𝑦∗ =
𝑠𝐾
𝜂 + 𝑔 + 𝛿 + 𝑐
𝛼
1−𝛼−𝛽 𝑠𝐻
𝜂 + 𝑔 + 𝛿 + 𝑐
𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
 
For the empirical speciﬁcation we must take natural logs of all variables and 
separate the technology parameter from GDP per worker. The technology parameter is 
determined by an initial level, A(0), and exogenous growth rate, g
t
, in At=A(0)e
gt. The 
form of our empirical model: 
ln [
𝑌𝑡
𝐿𝑡
] = ln 𝐴(0) + 𝑔𝑡 +
𝛼
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
ln(𝑠𝐾) +
𝛽
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
ln(𝑠𝐻) −
𝛼 + 𝛽
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
ln(𝜂 + 𝑔 + 𝛿 + 𝑐) 
The model in Mankiw et al. (1992) expresses human capital alternatively in levels 
by combining (7) and (10). Income per worker is now expressed as a function of the rate 
of investment, human capital, and the rate of population growth and capital destruction 
due to conﬂict: 
ln [
𝑌𝑡
𝐿𝑡
] = ln 𝐴(0) + 𝑔𝑡 +
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
ln(𝑠𝐾) +
𝛽
1 − 𝛼
ln(ℎ∗) −
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
ln(𝜂 + 𝑔 + 𝛿 + 𝑐) 
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1.9.3 Data 
The measure of human capital comes from Penn World Tables version 8.0 which 
compiles years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2013) and returns to education from 
Psacharopoulos (1993). The Barro and Lee (2013) dataset includes census and survey 
observations from UNESCO, statistic agencies, and other sources for educational 
attainment of individuals over 15 years of age. Psacharopoulos’ rate of return on 
education takes into account beneﬁts and costs of education, i.e. earnings and foregone 
earnings for attending school. 
The population growth variable also comes from version 8.0 of Penn World 
Tables and includes individuals of all ages, not only those of working age. This is a 
deviation from Mankiw et al. (1992) due to the desire for longer periods of consistent 
data and estimation efficiency. The regressions still yield similar results to Mankiw et al. 
(1992) in light of this substitution. 
The conﬂict variables are measures of duration and severity for both interstate 
and intrastate conﬂict from the Correlates of War database versions 4.1 and 4.0 
respectively. We may not take natural logs of this data due to the prevalence of many 
values of 0 during a period of peace, therefore the interpretation of coefficients from the 
regressions is not one of elasticity. A share of gross domestic product per worker is still 
determined by these conﬂict variables and is discussed in more detail in the results 
section. 
Gross domestic product per worker is measured in 2005 constant prices from 
Penn World Tables version 7.1. Version 8.0 includes separate variables for GDP and 
employment, but the 7.1 version is used to avoid discrepancies and missing 
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employment data. This variable corresponds to both dependent variable speciﬁcations 
by Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) and Mankiw et al. (1992). 
1.9.4 Results 
The original model by Mankiw et al. (1992) consists of samples from OECD 
countries, non-oil producing countries, and countries with populations less than 1 million 
and having poor data. I’ve restricted my analysis to OECD, Non-oil producing and all 
countries because poor data quality should not be the problem as the original paper 
was published over 20 years ago. The estimation procedure is ordinary least squares 
and the results are recorded in Table 18. The ﬁrst two columns are coefficients resulting 
from Mankiw et al. (1992). The independent variables are average investment and 
average population growth from 1960 to 1985. Solow theory predicts that coefficients for 
investment and population growth are 0.50 and -0.50 and this is true for OECD 
countries. The non-oil producing countries have larger coefficients than are otherwise 
predicted - a problem resolved in Mankiw et al. (1992) with the addition of human 
capital. 
The Mankiw et al. (1992) results are included with updated data from 1960 to 
2010 as a point of comparison. The Solow model does not seem to hold up with the 
inclusion of new OECD countries and a longer time period and the non-oil countries 
give us the same problem of inappropriately large coefficients. The support for the 
Solow model improves in the panel time-series analysis in Table 19. Comparing OLS 
and ﬁxed effects estimation results we notice smaller coefficients with higher 
significance. 
The inclusion of human capital allows for a better ﬁt of the data. Table 20 shows 
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just how much human capital explains logged GDP per worker. Mankiw et al. (1992) 
ﬁnd greater coefficients on human capital for OECD countries and Table 20 tells just the 
opposite story. There are some new OECD countries included in the sample and human 
capital may play less of a role than it did 30 years ago in determining GDP. Human 
capital matters to non-oil producing countries with coefficients of 2.89 compared to 1.49 
of OECD countries. The dependent variables, in Table 3, have means between 9 and 
10. The interstate war variable, as suspected, does not affect OECD countries in Tables 
20 and 21. 
Conﬂict as previously noted is a low to middle-income country problem as 
evidenced in Tables 15 though 18. Still in the ordinary least squares regressions we 
don’t receive consistently significant coefficients. The ﬁxed eﬀect estimations in Table 
21 are better suited for analysis in contrast to Table 20. The GDP of OECD countries is 
well-explained through human capital and the coefficients are not inappropriately large. 
All coefficients are of the correct sign and statistically signiﬁcant. The interstate conﬂict 
variable for non-oil producing countries accounts for almost the exact same share of 
GDP as the population growth rate. Therefore, in terms of explanatory power, conﬂict’s 
destructive effects seem to account for the same decline in GDP as the population 
growth rate. 
1.10 Conclusion 
The natural resource model from Sachs and Warner (1995) and the revision by 
Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) provide an empirical base from which we analyze 
conﬂict’s deleterious eﬀect on GDP growth per worker. Using GMM estimation 
techniques we arrive at conclusions similar to Polachek and Sevastianova (2010), but 
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with the distinct differences between interstate and civil war in the short and long-run. 
Civil war has lasting effects in an economy, over 5 and 10 years, with no short-run effect 
to the average worker’s standard of living. Interstate war has small effects in the short-
run, over 1 and 2-year periods, but larger effects over 20-year periods. The decline in 
GDP per worker is as much as 0.56 percent per year of interstate conﬂict. 
The inclusion of conﬂict in the Mankiw et al. (1992) augmented Solow model 
proves insightful theoretically and empirically. The disastrous effect of conﬂict 
represents as much of the share of GDP as Solow’s original population growth variable. 
The Solow model is also better analyzed through ﬁxed effects panel time-series 
estimation than ordinary least squares. 
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Figure 1: Real GDP per worker in Rwanda 1960-2011 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Real GDP per worker in Mexico 1960-2011 
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Figure 3: Log GDP per worker and civil war deaths 1960-2011 
 
 
Table 1: Civil war's duration 
 
 
 
Table 2: Civil war's severity 
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
 
 
 
Table 4: Panel unit root tests 
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Table 5: 20-year percent change in GDP per worker 
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Table 6: 1-year percent changes in GDP per worker 
 
 
 
Table 7: 2-year percent changes in GDP per worker 
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Table 8: 5-year percent changes in GDP per worker 
 
 
 
Table 9: 10-year percent changes in GDP per worker 
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Table 10: 1-year percent changes by region 
 
 
 
Table 11: 2-year percent changes by region 
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Table 12: 5-year percent changes by region 
 
 
 
Table 13: 10-year percent changes by region 
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Table 14: 20-year percent changes by region 
 
 
 
Table 15: Low income percent changes in GDP per worker 
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Table 16: Middle income percent changes in GDP per worker 
 
 
 
Table 17: High income percent changes in GDP per worker 
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Table 18: Original and current Mankiw regressions with average investment and 
population growth 
 
 
 
Table 19: OLS and fixed-effects regressions using panel time-series 1960-2011 
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Table 20: OLS regressions with current OECD, non-oil, and all countries from 
1960-2011 with and without conflict inclusive human capital 
 
 
 
Table 21: Fixed-effects regressions with current OECD, non-oil, and all countries 
from 1960-2011 with and without conflict inclusive human capital 
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CHAPTER 2 
FINANCIAL CRISES AND THE ONSET OF CIVIL WAR 
2.1 Introduction 
Financial crises have widespread eﬀects to governments and consumers in an 
economy: consumer wealth declines, government budgets are drained to purchase 
failing banks and assets, and business investment falls along with consumer 
conﬁdence. Of the 128 of civil wars, in Tables 34 through 36, 25 systemic banking 
crises have coincided with the onset of war or preceded it by 5 years. The prevalence of 
civil wars was also highest in the 1990s and curiously conﬂict-affected countries also 
faced more ﬁnancial crises during the same period on average.  
Therefore, if there is a relationship between banking crises and civil war, perhaps 
it is noticeable in the costliest banking crises since 1970: Indonesia in 1997 and Guinea-
Bissau in 1995. From Figures 4 and 5, the costliest banking crises in terms of ﬁscal cost 
and increases in debt concurrently experience or are superseded by civil war. This 
suggests that conditions arising from a ﬁnancial crisis can spur people to rebel. 
This paper addresses the role of ﬁnancial crises and the economy in relation to 
civil war. We seek to determine whether a ﬁnancial crisis can spur a rebellion for 
government control or cause ﬁghting with the government over local issues across an 
international sample of countries with different levels of income from 1970 to 2007. This 
issue is explained using background theory in conﬂict and empirical estimation using 
panel time-series logit regression techniques. 
Two models for the onset of civil war primarily explain rebel motivations: 
grievance and opportunity. A model of grievance-based risk, such as in Fearon (2003), 
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determines civil war’s risk through ethnic and religious differences, the level of 
democracy which offers government representation of such diversity, and income 
inequality. The economic opportunity model of civil war’s onset from Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) suggests rebel motivations are better explained by opportunity (greed) instead of 
grievance. Economic variables such as GDP and primary commodity exports (including 
oil and diamonds) predict the incentives for people to take up arms against their 
government and other groups. A country with low GDP per person indicates greater 
beneﬁts and lower opportunity costs to civil rebellion. An increase in primary commodity 
exports correlates to an increase in rents to be collected by the government and 
potential proﬁts in export markets – both cases make armed conﬂict more probable 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). This economic explanation is incomplete as other economic 
events can lower the opportunity cost of conﬂict and increase the relative beneﬁts to 
rebellion – namely a systemic banking crisis that lowers employment, consumer wealth, 
and a government’s ability to provide services and infrastructure to grieved citizens. 
We estimate opportunity and grievance models from Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
with base economic and political science variables but include measures of ﬁnance and 
banking: deposit to GDP ratios, capital formation, hyperinﬂation, and a ﬁnancial crisis 
dummy to capture the effect of financial instability and rising prices on civil war’s risk. A 
systemic banking crisis signiﬁcantly predicts the onset of civil war thus providing 
evidence that ﬁnance matters in civil war. In the subsample of Africa, a region with 
heavy conﬂict in the 1990s, ﬁnancial crises predict the onset of civil war within 5 years. 
The onset model for the Asian subsample predicts civil war within 2 years of a systemic 
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banking crisis. Samples of low income and highly-indebted poor countries (HIPC) reveal 
a greater risk of civil war developing from ﬁnancial crisis. 
To understand the economic impetus for civil war, ﬁrst a summary of civil war 
literature is needed. This ﬂows directly into a discussion of the variables: motivations 
behind their inclusion, their size of inﬂuence, and the difference between “greed” and 
“grievance”. Then models of opportunity (greed) and grievance are analyzed separately 
and together including ﬁnancial crisis determinants. I follow this by estimating onset in 
the subsamples of Africa, Asia, and highly-indebted poor countries. Then I distinguish 
between two types of war: a war for government control and a war over local issues. 
2.2 Why civil war and finance? 
Civil war occurs more frequently than international war and has spillover effects 
to neighboring countries (Hegre et al., 2011). Collier (1999) contends that civil wars can 
be “more damaging than international wars” due to the locale of destruction. Given the 
greater frequency and severity of civil war than international war and the prevalence of 
ﬁnancial crises since the 1970s, the theory and estimation of civil war’s onset related to 
financial markets seems worthy of examination. 
Civil wars and ﬁnancial crises have much in common, for instance, they are both 
contagious (Bordo and Murshid, 2000; Hausken and Plümper, 2002; Murdoch and 
Sandler, 2002). Capital formation declines in both cases and capital ﬂight increases 
(Davies, 2007; Greene, 2002). The onset of conﬂict and ﬁnancial crises is also related 
to a weak, indebted government. Output losses are common in both cases as in Cerra 
and Saxena (2008) wherein civil wars create larger declines in output, but are less 
persistent than ﬁnancial crises. Government spending increases substantially in war 
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and ﬁnancial crisis: to ﬁnance the war through military expenditure (Braun and 
McGrattan, 1993) or to purchase failing ﬁnancial assets like non-performing loans from 
banks (Valencia and Laeven, 2008). Both civil wars and ﬁnancial crises are aberrations 
to a stable economy and government, but economic instability and government 
inefficacy may also cause both. In any case, due to the similarity of determinants and 
their contagious nature, crises and civil wars may in fact be related such that the 
conditions arising from a ﬁnancial crisis create an environment conducive to civil war. 
2.3 Literature review 
 2.3.1 Civil war’s onset 
The research related to civil war risk began in the late 1990s (Collier, 1998; 
Fearon, 1998) and early 2000s (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004;Fearon and Laitin, 2003), 
shortly after the greatest amount of countries experienced civil war4. The base 
regression in Fearon and Laitin (2003) contains measures of gross national income, 
population, percent of mountainous terrain, oil production, democracy, and others which 
were modeled ﬁrst in Fearon and Laitin (2003). In Collier and Hoeffler (2004), similar 
variables are included along with economic variables of GDP, GDP growth, and primary 
commodity exports5. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) explain civil war’s onset economically in terms of 
opportunity cost alongside measures of ethnic and religious fractionalization, 
                                            
4 See Tables 34 through 36 
5 However, Fearon (2005), in contrast to Collier and Hoeffler (2004), ﬁnds that primary 
commodity exports insigniﬁcantly explain the onset of civil war. Fearon explains that oil 
exportation, which is correlated with primary commodity exports at r=0.46, is signiﬁcant 
and this is the determining factor in civil war’s onset. 
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democracy, and income inequality. Some differences between the opportunity model of 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and the grievance-based model in Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
are that Collier uses logged GDP per capita and GDP growth, instead of gross national 
income per person. Collier and Hoffler (2004) also implement logged population in the 
current year as opposed to Fearon’s 1-year lag of logged population. The reason for this 
may be related to the complexity involved in determining the start and end dates of civil 
war and the estimation in 1-year and 5-year groups discussed below. 
There are two main datasets of civil war: the Correlates of War project and the 
Uppsala/PRIO database. One difference between these conﬂict datasets is the date of 
civil war onset6 and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) may account for this by recording the 
onset if civil war began during a ﬁve-year time period. In contrast to the ﬁve-year 
measure, this paper is concerned with yearly changes7 and takes advantage of the 
Correlates of War database which is accurate to the start day of conﬂict. A yearly 
estimation of civil war’s onset allows for more observations than 5-year average 
estimations and therefore rigorous panel-time series regression techniques which 
require many observations. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
6 See discussion in section 2.5.1 Correlates of War and Uppsala/PRIO. 
7 Other civil war onset analyses have considered yearly analyses, such as Fearon 
(2005). 
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2.3.2 Government’s role in civil war 
 This paper argues that systemic banking crises play a role in the onset of civil 
war and therefore government spending and policy during a financial crisis8 must also 
be important. Easterly (2001) positively connects political instability to government 
consumption - ineffective governments consume more. Barro (1989) ﬁnds an inverse 
relationship between growth and government consumption hence as economic activity 
declines, the risk of civil war increases9 along with government consumption. Collier 
(1999) adds to this sentiment and writes, “the government’s capacity to collect revenues 
and provide essential services” is disrupted during war. Elbadawi (1999) explains that a 
government involved in civil war is “less effective in dealing with poverty”. A government 
in civil war spends more, yet collects less revenue from its tax base and is less effective 
in providing wealth-improving services to its citizens. 
In addition to the issue of government capacity to provide services, there is also 
an issue with the perception of government policy changes. The policies of an indebted 
government in civil war are less likely to be seen as credible by rebel forces (Elbadawi, 
1999). Any government policy changes may be seen as simple appeasement to end a 
conﬂict and not indicative of long-lasting change that rebels desire. 
For a government involved in war, victory depends upon a taxable base that 
increases government revenues and therefore military capacity (Elbadawi, 1999). This 
                                            
8 For instance, government policy related to purchasing insolvent banks and non-
performing assets which are connected with the tradeoffs (opportunity costs) to 
government-provided services and development. 
9 This is explained through the economic theory of conflict using opportunity costs. 
42 
 
 
government victory seems less probable when government debt increases by 86 
percent on average in the three years after a banking crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009). Therefore, the years following a ﬁnancial crisis will be very important in terms of 
government defense and maintaining stable economic growth. 
Hess and Orphanides (2001) suggest that some government leaders of non-
democracies receive appropriative beneﬁts from a conﬂict while the costs are left to 
their citizens. In summary, governments play a role in civil war through spending 
decisions, policy changes, taxation, and perhaps even an opportunistic motive. 
2.3.3 The relationship between war and finance 
A connection between civil war risk and financial markets has yet to be made, but the 
economy and ﬁnancial markets in particular are clearly affected by war through bond 
markets, the accumulation of capital and its ﬂight from the conﬂict zone, and overall 
consumption change as a result of conﬂict. Frey and Kucher (2001) ﬁnd that European 
bond markets reacted to major events in World War II. After all, if a nation does not 
exist, it cannot service its public debt. In this case of international war, “the outbreak of 
the war depressed both bonds” (Frey and Kucher, 2001). However, during the war, 
investors in government bonds based their decisions on the country’s probability of 
victory and therefore the probability of repayment. A better investment decision may be 
to send capital abroad out of troubled areas. 
Davies (2007) explains that conﬂict causes a risky environment for investment 
and induces capital ﬂight. During a widespread internal conﬂict, funds may be looted or 
misappropriated thus motivating investors to look abroad “to a location where [funds] 
cannot be traced or retrieved by lawmakers” (Davies, 2007). However, Davies 
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acknowledges that there hasn’t been analysis of capital ﬂight before the onset of civil 
war. 
Rose and Blomberg (2010) consider the aftermath of terrorist attacks in the 
economy and highlight the “immediate attention and support” needed to ﬁnancial 
markets. Blattman and Miguel (2010) suggest that ﬁnancial analysis can be applied to 
explain the recruitment for and organization of civil war. Blomberg and Hess (2012) 
determine consumption growth in the presence of conﬂict and ﬁnd that individuals in 
conﬂict-affected countries would trade 9 percent of their current consumption to live in 
peace10. Blomberg and Hess (2012) highlight the value of tradeoffs that individuals 
make in an economy that may or may not experience conﬂict. 
One reason to make such a tradeoff is due to conﬂict which “lowers the discount 
factor for valuing future welfare” by increasing the probability of death (Blomberg and 
Hess, 2012; Blanchard, 1985). If people are more likely to die today, they are less likely 
to place a high value on their future welfare. A ﬁnancial crisis may also lower expected 
future welfare and make an individual more likely to join a rebellion. 
Blomberg and Hess (2002) measure breakpoints of recession or expansion in the 
economy and the probability of resulting internal and external conﬂicts. They encode 
recessions and expansions with a 1 or 0 respectively and estimate the joint probabilities 
of a country in a state of conﬂict or peace given a recession or expansion in the 
previous period. This type of estimation is called a bivariate Markov process and 
                                            
10 Blomberg and Hess (2012) model a business cycle via Day (1992) with conﬂict 
disruptions to ﬁnd the lower bound on the cost of war. 
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predicts the occurrence of one event given the occurrence of another event (or events) 
in the previous period. 
The limitations of Blomberg and Hess (2002) are in the consideration of only 
GDP in a state of growth or decline. Other factors which may determine the onset of war 
are not considered. Another consideration is that a systemic banking crisis may not 
result in a decline in GDP and a recession may not be related to a ﬁnancial crisis. 
However, on average a systemic banking crisis does result in declining economic 
activity. The conﬂict-causing effects of a recession, often spurred by a ﬁnancial crisis11, 
may understate the role of ﬁnance and banking in creating conditions for civil rebellion. 
The ﬁnancial analyses so far explain the effect war has on finance, but what role 
can ﬁnance play in the onset of civil war? Collier and Hoeffler (2004) explain economic 
predictors for civil war: “dependence upon primary commodity exports, low average 
income of the country, and slow growth”. Primary commodity exports, like oil, are 
immobile, lootable, and heavily taxed thus ripe for rebel predation. Little economic 
growth equates to fewer job and schooling opportunities and easier rebel recruitment. 
Low GDP per person suggests lower opportunity costs to joining a rebel organization 
and government military. However, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) explain “tax revenue 
rises with income” and less government revenue “reduces the capacity of the 
government to spend on defense, and so makes rebel predation easier”. A government 
in debt due to ﬁnancial crisis is a weak government and more likely to face opposition 
from rebel groups. 
                                            
11 Since the 1990s, more than 70 percent of the total amount of recessions were related 
to financial markets. 
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2.4 The onset of civil war - a description of the main conflict variable 
The measure for the onset of civil war is constructed from the Correlates of War 
Intra-state Wars database version 4.112. The onset of war is defined as a dummy 
variable, 0 or 1, which indicates the first year of civil war in a country. For example, the 
Hukbalahap Rebellion began in 1950 in the Philippines and the 1 indicates the onset of 
that war in Table 22. 
In this case, there is no indication of the length of rebellion or the severity of 
conflict. There is only a data point of “1” in 1950 to indicate something happened in 
1950 to spur an uprising. This paper argues that the state of the economy, not only 
political governance, has an important role to play.  
The Intra-state war database records wars that take place “within the recognized 
territory of a state” and “the war must involve sustained combat, involving organized 
armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a 
twelve month period” (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). 
The scholars who originally developed the COW dataset, Melvin Small and J. 
David Singer, also differentiate between genocide and rebellion. They establish 
conditions such that both sides provide an effective degree of resistance. Three 
different types of civil war are coded: state vs. non-state entity, regional subunit of state 
vs. non-state, and intercommunal wars or non-state vs. non-state entities. Two types of 
state vs. non-state war are further identified: war for central control or over local issues.  
                                            
12 This data can be found at: http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war. 
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One example of civil war for central control is the Democratic Republic of Congo 
in the late 70s and 90s. Civil war in the Darfur region of Sudan is an example of war 
over local issues as the SLA and JEM do not wish for state control. The Cultural 
Revolution in China in 1967 is an example of regional internal war. The Christian Tarok 
and Muslim Fulani in Nigeria fighting amongst each other in 2004 is identified as an 
intercommunal war. Civil wars in Africa are typically fought for government control, while 
wars in Asia are fought with the government over local issues. 
2.5 Alternative data specifications 
 2.5.1 Correlates of War13 and Uppsala/PRIO14 
A rebel force does not typically announce the start of its insurrection nor does the 
government vocalize the beginning of its counter-insurgency tactics. Therefore, there is 
some discrepancy in the start dates of civil war between the updated Small and Singer 
dataset from Sarkees, Reid and Wayman (2010) called the “Correlates of War” (COW) 
and the Uppsala/PRIO dataset from Gleditsch et al. (2002). The reasons for choosing 
the COW data are discussed in the Data section above: very accurate starting dates of 
war and a strict deﬁnition of civil war. The Uppsala/PRIO dataset by comparison 
specifies civil war slightly different. For instance, Northern Ireland is considered in a 
state of conﬂict between 1971 and 1993 for the PRIO dataset, but the episode is absent 
                                            
13 Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. 
Washington DC: CQ Press. 
14 Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, 
and H˚avard Strand (2002) Armed Conﬂict 1946-2001: A New Dataset. Journal of 
Peace Research 39(5). 
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in the Correlates of War. Thailand’s speciﬁcation of civil war lasts from 1970 to 1982 in 
the PRIO dataset, but only from 1972 to 1973 in COW data. 
To address this issue, I also include regression results with a speciﬁcation of civil 
war’s onset from Uppsala/PRIO in Table 31. The model does not perform as well - there 
is less signiﬁcance in the gross domestic product variables likely due to the longer 
speciﬁcation of conﬂict periods by Uppsala/PRIO15. Also, the Correlates of War project 
data has been used in Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), two 
sources from which this paper is inspired. 
2.5.2 Penn World Tables and the World Development Indicators 
 Gross domestic product from the Penn World Tables have been used previously 
in analyzing civil war and therefore a short comparison and explanation is warranted for 
choosing the World Development Indicators from the World Bank. The Penn World 
Tables generally have earlier GDP data going back to 1960 in developing countries like 
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Somalia, and Uganda. 
The World Development Indicators have more data for other countries like Sudan and 
Sierra Leone in addition to more recent data up to 200716. The analysis of conﬂict with 
ﬁnancial crises occurs mainly during and after the 1990s17, so I chose the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database. 
                                            
15 Another issue is that the Uppsala/PRIO dataset considers combatant and non-
combatant battle deaths as opposed to Small and Singer’s combatant battle deaths. 
16 As a side note, economic, political and ﬁnancial data used in this paper are sourced 
from Catini and Saade (2010) (http://sites.google.com/site/md4stata/). 
17 From 1970 to 2007 there have been 375 years of systemic banking crises with 70 
percent occurring after the Cold War. 
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A choice was made not to combine the two datasets since the speciﬁcation of 
GDP per capita, GDP growth, and population is diﬀerent in each dataset. This would 
result in fairly large changes from one year to the next if missing data from WDI is 
replaced with Penn data in the same country. Fearon and Laitin discovered this problem 
in Fearon and Laitin (2003) and used techniques of data generation and interpolation to 
derive gross national income: 
“We used income growth rates from the World Development Indicators 2001 to 
extend the estimates in the Penn World Tables 5.6 and then used the per capita 
energy consumption estimates provided by the COW project to estimate 
additional missing values.” 
In using this method to generate and compile data, a question arises as to 
whether the researchers are actually estimating the onset of conﬂict with a uniﬁed 
measure of gross national income18. In order to avoid such a complication I estimate the 
main regressions again using GDP per capita, GDP growth and population levels from 
the Penn World Tables. From Table 32, the results are very similar for Africa and Asia 
with WDI data, but the ﬁnancial crisis dummy and its lags are insigniﬁcant for the entire 
sample. However, the severity of ﬁnancial crisis is still a signiﬁcant determinant of the 
onset of civil war in all samples. 
 
 
 
                                            
18 For a detailed explanation of data generation in Fearon and Laitin (2003), go to: 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/workingpapers/addtabs.pdf 
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2.6 Economic predictors of conflict 
 2.6.1 Gross domestic product per capita 
Gross domestic product per capita, along with GDP growth and population, come from 
the World Development Indicators database from 2013. The log of current GDP per 
capita measures consumer buying power and economic well-being of a country’s 
citizens. The common explanation for including GDP per capita in a conﬂict model is 
that it measures the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion. There is a tradeoﬀ to starting 
a civil war and joining a rebellion - namely the lost wages and economic opportunities a 
person gives up when they decide to ﬁght. When GDP per capita is low, the relative 
beneﬁts to ﬁghting and acquiring resources through looting are higher than otherwise. 
However, when GDP per capita is low, the government can also easily recruit for 
the military and provide counterinsurgency measures. This suggests an important role 
of the government in tax collection that builds revenue to protect the country – higher 
GDP per capita equates to more government revenue through tax collection, greater 
military capacity, and less opportunity for citizens to revolt. 
2.6.2 Gross domestic product per capita growth 
 The growth in GDP per year in percentage terms from the World Development 
Indicators database measures the overall growth in economic well-being per year per 
person. Short-term changes in income can aﬀect the opportunity costs of rebellion as 
previously mentioned. The loss of employment and education opportunities make 
subversive activities more attractive by comparison. The less GDP growth in a given 
year, the more likely is a civil war to begin. 
2.6.3 Population 
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Countries with large populations are at a higher risk of civil war than otherwise. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) suggest that both opportunity and grievance-based motives 
increase with population size. This variable comes from the World Development 
Indicators 2013 dataset as well. Population and GDP per capita are logged variables to 
decrease the variability that exists between countries. 
John Maynard Keynes wrote about the economic consequences of World War I 
before his popular work on the Great Depression. In Keynes (1919), Keynes highlights 
the signiﬁcance of a large population leading to the Russian Civil War of late 1917: 
“Thus the extraordinary occurrences of the past two years in Russia, that vast 
upheaval of Society, which has overturned what seemed most stable...may owe 
more to the deep inﬂuences of expanding numbers than to Lenin or to Nicholas; 
and the disruptive powers of excessive national fecundity may have played a 
greater part in bursting the bonds of convention than either the power of ideas or 
the errors of autocracy.” 
 Keynes (1919) suggests that an expanding population may contribute more to 
civil war than government folly or ideological motivation. Even in the year of 1919 the 
underlying reasons for conﬂict were theorized to have motivations other than political or 
ethnic grievance. This is central to the economic perspective of the onset of civil war. 
2.6.8 Hyperinflation 
 Steve Hanke and Nicholas Krus are economists at the Johns Hopkins University 
and they’ve collected 56 instances of hyperinﬂation dating back to the French 
Revolution in 1795. The exchange rate between two countries is key to identifying 
hyperinﬂation. Hanke explains, “the ratio of the price level between two countries is 
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equivalent to their exchange rate”. If one country experiences hyperinﬂation, then the 
exchange rate with another country changes drastically. Two trading partners can 
therefore both eventually experience hyperinﬂation as rising prices “travel” through 
trade. 
Most of the hyperinﬂation data is in terms of consumer prices since they “best 
reﬂect price changes experienced by the ﬁnal consumer”. Hanke deﬁnes hyperinﬂation 
according to Cagan (1956) which is a monthly inﬂation rate greater than 50 percent. 
Both civil and international war are also associated with hyperinﬂation. Hanke 
explains, “Hyperinﬂation is an economic malady that arises under extreme conditions: 
war, political mismanagement, and the transition from a command to market-based 
economy – to name a few.”19 A regime change, for instance due to a successful rebel 
overthrow of government, can change the structure of government and therefore also 
the economy. 
2.6.9 Systemic banking crises 
In the midst of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, two researchers from the International Monetary 
Fund prepared a database on systemic banking crises with a focus on the timing and 
type of crisis. This ﬁnancial crisis variable comes from the updated dataset in Valencia 
and Laeven (2010) and identiﬁes the start and end of 42 banking crises. 
I’ve identiﬁed these banking crises with a dummy variable taking the value of “1” 
at the onset of crisis and every year during the crisis. The years for which no banking 
                                            
19 The collection of hyperinflation events can be found at: 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/ﬁles/pubs/pdf/workingpaper-8.pdf. 
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crisis occurred receive a value of “0”. This variable identiﬁes the onset and duration of 
ﬁnancial crises associated with banking. 
The timing of a banking crisis is determined by the amount of non-performing 
loans as a percentage of total loans, gross ﬁscal costs and output loss as a percentage 
of GDP, and minimum real GDP growth. The researchers cross-check the crisis dates 
with the timing of deposit runs, deposit freezes, liquidity support, and bank interventions 
(Valencia and Laeven, 2008). This variable is positively correlated with civil war. 
Demand deposits and capital formation as a percentage of GDP, along with real 
GDP growth are also described below as they are signiﬁcant predictors of the onset of 
civil war in addition to ﬁnancial crisis. Many conditions requisite for ﬁnancial crisis are 
also shared by civil war due to the relative decrease in opportunity costs of rebellion and 
relative increase in beneﬁts through stolen commodities, rents on those commodities, or 
government control and appropriation of wealth. 
2.6.10 Financial crisis severity 
Valencia and Laeven (2008) measure the output loss to GDP in the years 
following the onset of ﬁnancial crisis to determine it’s severity. Therefore, the output loss 
can be calculated as the diﬀerence between potential GDP and actual GDP over the 
entire period of crisis. However, the estimate in Valencia and Laeven (2008) doesn’t 
account for yearly losses in output. 
Therefore, the ﬁnancial crisis dummy, which takes a value of “1” for every year in 
which the crisis occurs, can be multiplied by the GDP growth rate from the WDI 
database to determine the yearly declines in GDP associated with the systemic banking 
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crisis. This variable operates as a measure of crisis severity20 – larger declines in GDP 
will increase the risk of civil war given the economic (opportunistic) motivations for civil 
war. 
2.6.11 Deposit money - bank assets (percentage of GDP) 
Valencia and Laeven (2008) explain, “In some cases, the crisis is triggered by 
depositor runs on banks, though in most cases it is a general realization that 
systemically important ﬁnancial institutions are in distress.” Banks that are in ﬁnancial 
trouble will try to prevent customers from withdrawing their money through bank 
holidays and deposit freezes to maintain what assets they do have in the midst of rising 
costs from non-performing loans. This variable is measured as a percent of GDP and is 
negatively related to conﬂict. More bank assets relative to GDP equate to less chance of 
ﬁnancial crisis and civil war. 
2.6.12 Gross capital formation (percentage of GDP) 
During a systemic banking crisis, ﬁnancial capital is exhausted and capital ﬂows 
may slow or even reverse (Valencia and Laeven, 2008). There will simply be less 
demand for capital investment during crisis. This variable comes from the World 
Development Indicators 2013 dataset and is measured as a percent of GDP. It is also 
negatively related to ﬁnancial crises and civil war. 
During a ﬁnancial crisis and civil war, people will seek stable sources of 
investment for their wealth. The possibility of looting during civil war is higher than 
                                            
20 An alternate method may involve ﬁnding the average output loss per year associated 
with the crisis, similar to ﬁnding the average number of battle deaths per year 
associated with civil war in the following chapter. 
54 
 
 
otherwise and a bank in arrears may not oﬀer such stability. Therefore, one would 
expect less domestic capital investment. 
2.6.13 Male enrollment in secondary education 
The combatants in civil wars are likely to be young men. If young men choose to 
attend school, then they increase the opportunity cost of participating in rebellion. The 
foregone future wages from a secondary school education must be equal to or less than 
the future beneﬁt of rebellion for a young man to ﬁght in a civil conﬂict. Therefore, fewer 
young males will be in school in a country at higher risk for civil war. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant relationship between the 
onset of conﬂict and male enrollment in secondary school. This variable is included to 
establish similarity between past research and the current paper, comes from the WDI 
2013 dataset, and has a negative relationship to the onset of civil war. 
2.6.14 Fuel exports (percentage of merchandise exports) 
Countries that have more exports comprised of oil, diamonds, and other natural 
resources are at higher risk for civil war since the acquisition of such goods can be 
ﬁnancially lucrative. A government can also extract high rents from the production and 
exportation of oil thus increasing the beneﬁt of civil war for government control. Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004) explain that grievances play a role in recruitment of rebels, but 
sometimes the underlying reasons for civil unrest are economic. 
The ﬁnancing of rebellion, according to Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Dodds 
(2002), involves the extortion of natural resources. Collier models this extortion through 
the presence of high levels of primary commodity exports which include conﬂict 
resources like oil and diamonds. Fearon (2005) argues that the inclusion of primary 
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commodity exports in Collier (2004) may capture a real driver of conﬂict which is oil 
exportation. The oil exportation variable presented in this paper is fuel exports as a 
percentage of merchandise exports from the World Development Indicators 2013 
database21. It is positively correlated with the onset of civil war. When fuel exports 
comprise a large percentage of exports, the probability of conﬂict is higher. 
2.7 Grievance-based indicators of conflict 
2.7.1 Ethnic fractionalization 
Many of the conﬂict models mentioned previously include a measure of ethnic 
diversity called ethnic fractionalization. James Fearon collected this data by country and 
year with each data point measured as a value between 0 and 1. If you randomly select 
two people from a population, this variable measures the probability that they came 
from different ethnic groups. Therefore, countries with values close to one are ethnically 
heterogeneous (diverse) and countries close to 0 are ethnically homogenous. 
Previous work from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
have found that “more ethnically diverse countries show no strong tendency to have a 
greater risk of civil wars if one compares states at similar levels of economic 
development” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). One explanation for this is that grievances 
are not shared equally among different ethnic groups and it is therefore harder to 
organize and recruit for a rebellion in ethnically diverse communities. This variable is 
generally negative in determining conﬂict - the more ethnically-heterogeneous the 
society, the smaller the chance of civil war. 
                                            
21 This variable is also similar to primary commodity exports used in Reynal-Querol 
(2002). 
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However, when a country has greater than 45percent ethnic majority, then it is 
sufficiently homogenized and ripe for rebel organization and government oppression. 
The majority group is then large enough to oppress the minority group through 
government policy and other social means. This ethnic majority dummy variable is 
positively related to civil war. 
2.7.2 Democracy 
Polity is another signiﬁcant determinant of civil war used in Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) that measures democracy on a scale from -10 to 
+10. Strongly democratic governments will receive positive values close to 10 and more 
autocratic governments receive negative values close to -10. This variable is negatively 
related to all forms of conﬂict – more democratic societies lead to less conﬂict. 
One reason for this is that people of minority ethnic backgrounds have more 
inﬂuence in government policy in democratic societies. With government representation, 
there is less reason to hold grievances against the ethnic majority (Ellingsen, 2000). 
However, in terms of changing government policy, democratic societies are much less 
effective (Reynal-Querol, 2002). 
2.7.3 Political constraints 
The feasibility of government policy change is a very high determinant of the risk 
of civil war onset. We might expect more feasible policy changes in democratic 
governments and if people see that a government can change, then they are less likely 
to rebel against it; however, this is not the case.  
Reynal-Querol (2002) discusses this relationship between political systems and 
conﬂict. She concludes that in a proportional system (a politically fractionalized 
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government) the “opportunity cost of rebellion is higher than in a majoritarian system” 
Reynal-Querol, 2002). She explains that this representation in government is more 
important for peace than the level of democracy, i.e. polity.  
With more political constraint, and less change in government policy, we see a 
lower risk of civil war. The index score ranges from 0 to 1 with “higher scores indicating 
more political constraint” (Teorell et al., 2015). The index accounts for the number of 
branches in government with veto power, the degree of party alignment within the 
branches (less party alignment means more political constraint), and the degree to 
which preferences are unaligned within each legislative branch, i.e. legislative 
fractionalization. A divided house will not fall and also will not change government 
policy. 
A more diverse government actually allows for more political constraints, less 
chance of changing government policy, and less chance of civil uprising. If people see 
that a government can change its policies easily, they are more likely to rebel. 
Legislative fractionalization may be the driver in increasing the risk of civil war. 
The countries in which civil wars occur have very low political constraints –a 
great deal of party alignment in legislative branches, fewer independent branches with 
veto power, and majority preferences in common. In aggregate, this allows for easy 
change to government policy and more probably policy change in favor of the majority 
group. 
The political constraints index highlights the importance of political representation 
in government – less minority representation equates to fewer political constraints and a 
higher risk of civil war. This variable actually performs much better than the traditional 
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inclusion of ethnic fractionalization and polity over a long time period with many 
observations. It is a variable from the Quality of Governance dataset from Teorell et al. 
(2015). 
2.7.4 Regime durability 
The duration of peace between civil wars has been an explanatory variable in 
previous conﬂict models22 and regime durability measures the number of years since a 
change in regime (government). The change in government is indicated by a 0 and 
every year that follows receives a value of 1 until the next regime change. The regime 
change is determined by the polity scale in a year for which the country becomes 
substantially more democratic or autocratic (+/- 3 points). This is another Quality of 
Governance indicator variable. 
2.7.5 Cold War and fuel export dummy variables23 
A dummy variable has been proposed in the conﬂict literature to distinguish 
between times before and after the Cold War (Lacina, 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; 
Collier and Rohner, 2008). This Cold War variable takes the value of 1 for years after 
1990 and 0 otherwise. The inclusion of this dummy does not signiﬁcantly improve the 
regressions, except in Africa where the prevalence of conﬂict increased in the 1990s.  
Fuel exports greater than 30percent of total exports have been hypothesized as 
signiﬁcant contributors to the onset of conﬂict in Fearon (2003); however, this variable 
does not enter signiﬁcantly into any variants of the onset regression. 
                                            
22 One example is from Collier and Hoeffler (2004). 
23 These variables were insignificant in my regressions and therefore not included in the 
tables or results. 
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2.7.6 Inequality – Gini index 
To better model the eﬀect of grievance on civil war, we must also consider 
income inequality. A country that distributes wealth more evenly is less likely to 
experience civil unrest on average. Grievances occur when wealth is concentrated 
among a small percentage of the population and the rest are left in poverty.  
Typically emerging countries have greater income inequality than developed 
countries – as a country develops, wealth is accrued, and people can aﬀord better 
government services. More money is acquired by the government and distributed 
equally among citizens as the country develops. The developed country is also less 
likely to have its citizens rebel and overthrow a government which improves their living 
conditions. 
The Gini index is measured on a scale from 0 to 100 with countries closer to zero 
having very equal distribution of income and countries closer to 100 having more 
income inequality. As a reference point, the U.S. had a GINI index value of 46.4 in 2004 
and a conﬂict-prone country, Nicaragua, had a score of 52.3 in 2005. 
2.8 Methods 
The logit model estimates a binary dependent variable which takes only the 
values of one or zero. This dependent variable is qualitative in nature which means it 
explains something like an event, instead of a dollar value or quantitative amount. In 
contrast to a linear probability model, like with ordinary least squares, the logit model 
generates coefficients which are the change in the log odds of civil war’s onset with an 
increase of one unit in the independent variable. To make practical sense of the effect 
of financial crises on civil war, we determine predicted probabilities for an average 
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country in the entire data set and in each subsample. This probability is sometimes 
called the response probability (Wooldridge, 2008) and takes a value between 0 and 1: 
𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑘) 
A fixed-effects estimation with static variables such as ethnic and religious 
fractionalization along with polity (our measure of democracy) is inappropriate and 
random-effects is chosen instead. The Hausman test can verify our choice as well, but 
in simply comparing regression results, the logit and panel time-series logit models are 
very similar.  
Fixed-effects estimation controls for ceteris paribus effects through the arbitrary 
correlation between ai and xitj. With static variables, i.e. variables which do not change 
over time, fixed-effects estimation is not appropriate. With random-effects estimation we 
expect some unobserved effect which is not correlated with other independent variables 
(Wooldridge, 2008). The random-effects logit estimator for panel time-series has the 
following form: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝑥𝑖𝑗, 𝑢𝑖) = 𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑏 + 𝑢𝑖) 
One issue with using logit models is the lack of R
2
 or simply a good measure of 
fit. Log likelihood values are only effective when comparing one regression model to 
another. Therefore, as a very basic means of comparability between models I include 
the log likelihood values in each table of results for the onset of war. 
2.9 Estimating the onset of civil war 
During a civil war, it is difficult to distinguish between rebel ﬁghters and looters or 
bandits. Early models of conﬂict by Grossman (1999) suggest that civil insurrections can 
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generate proﬁtable opportunities that a time of peace may not. The impetus from this 
viewpoint is greed, not grievance. 
If economic conditions like low GDP per capita, low GDP growth, and a high 
percentage of commodity exports can determine the risk of conﬂict’s onset, then an 
economic event like a ﬁnancial crisis which lowers consumer wealth and drains 
government budgets can also predict the onset of war. At the onset of a ﬁnancial crisis, 
bank deposits are low due to consumers removing their wealth from the unstable 
institutions. With bank assets declining and ﬁnancial costs rising due to non-performing 
loans, banks typically lend less money to their customers. As a result, business 
investment declines and the percentage of capital formation to GDP also declines. 
Although ﬁnancial crises begin for many different reasons, this is a common theme 
since ﬁnancial crises have been recorded in 1970. 
2.10 Results 
 2.10.1 The opportunity model 
I regress the onset of conﬂict in the entire sample on the base regression 
variables from Collier’s opportunity model with the inclusion of speciﬁc ﬁnancial crisis 
predictors. The results in Table 23 indicate the strong predictors of GDP growth, GDP 
per capita, peace, and population on civil war’s risk. 
Model 1 and 2 in Table 23 are close reproductions of the opportunity model in 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004); however, they show that fuel exports as a percentage of 
merchandise exports (and it’s square) do not signiﬁcantly predict civil war. This variable 
measures only fuel exports, similar to Fearon (2005), instead of primary commodity 
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exports from Collier and Hoeffler (2004). James Fearon presents a host of reasons24 
why primary commodity exports are inappropriate in a country-year analysis in Fearon 
(2005); therefore I use a variable more related to fuel exports as he suggests. 
The economic variables of GDP growth, population, GDP per capita and the 
measure of regime durability (peace) from Table 23 Model 3 significantly predict the risk 
of civil war. Now with a base regression of significant variables, I add financial variables 
that may predict the risk of conflict.  
In Model 4 of Table 23, the deposits to GDP variable is included as an 
expression of banking health and consumer conﬁdence in banks as a storehouse of 
wealth. If people do not trust banks to remain solvent, then they remove their assets 
and ﬁnancial markets suffer. 
If declining bank deposits are related to ﬁnancial crisis, then it makes sense to 
simply test the start and duration of a ﬁnancial crisis on civil war’s onset. In Model 5 
from Table 23 the ﬁnancial crisis dummy variable has no signiﬁcant effect when the 
crisis occurs in the same year as the civil war’s onset. The ﬁnancial crisis does have a 
signiﬁcant effect in Model 6 of Table 23 when it occurs 5 years before the beginning of 
civil war. This suggests that a ﬁnancial crisis has some relation to a civil war when it 
precedes the war by 5 years. 
The coefficients from random-effects logit estimation, for example in Model 6 of 
Table 23, do not represent predicted probabilities, but log odds of civil war’s onset. The 
                                            
24 Fearon (2005) argues mainly that primary commodity exports are driven by oil exports 
which is evident in a yearly analysis, instead of the 5-year panel from Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004). 
63 
 
 
risk of civil war’s onset when an average country has faced a financial crisis 5 years 
prior are approximately 1.6percent in the opportunity model. This small risk must be 
considered in the context of a completely average country – when other factors are 
taken into account, this risk increases substantially as is evidenced in later analysis.  
2.10.2 The grievance model 
The political science literature often explains the onset of war in terms of 
political/governance and grievance variables25. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) propose a 
model similar to Table 24, wherein ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, 
ethnic dominance, democracy, regime durability, and population determine the onset of 
civil war. In Table 24 Model 1, religious fractionalization does not seem to play any 
signiﬁcant role in the onset of war26. The Gini measure of inequality is measured 
separately due to low observation numbers in Table 24 Model 2 and is only signiﬁcant 
at 10percent. This may explain conﬂict’s onset better than ethnic fractionalization as 
ethnic fractionalization and the ethnic majority variables lose significance. It is likely that 
ethnic groups are also divided by income such that these variables are related. 
In any case, by dropping the insigniﬁcant variables, a highly signiﬁcant base 
regression can be tested with new variables: political constraints, deposits to GDP, and 
the ﬁnancial crisis dummy. Political constraint is a measure of legislative 
fractionalization that leads to new government policy changes. This variable, as 
opposed to polity, has been proposed to be the real driver behind non-democratic 
                                            
25 However, new literature has taken more economic factors into account. 
26 This non-effect has been suggested before in Collier and Hoeffler (2004). 
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governments’ experience of conﬂict (Reynal-Querol, 2002). In Table 24 Model 3 the 
variable enters signiﬁcantly and is therefore used in the combined model’s analysis that 
follows. 
The addition of ﬁnancial variables do not work very well in tandem with measures 
of political grievance. Only the deposit assets to GDP variable explains the onset of 
conﬂict signiﬁcantly in Table 24 Model 4. The 5-year lagged crisis variable predicts 
war’s onset with probability of 2percent. It may be more instructive to consider the 
political grievance variables together with economic opportunity variables in Table 25. 
2.10.3 The combined grievance and opportunity model 
The combined opportunity and grievance model in Table 25 closely follows 
specifications in Collier and Hoeffler (2004): fuel exports as a percentage of total 
merchandise exports, fuel exports squared, GDP per capita, GDP growth, peace, 
population, ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, ethnic dominance, 
democracy, and political constraints on passing new government policy. From Model 1 
to Model 2 in Table 25, I drop the insigniﬁcant variables of fuel exports and religious 
fractionalization which were previously determined insignificant. Model 2 shows the 
greater explanatory power of economic variables as opposed to political variables in the 
onset of civil war27. Also, a combination of variables from Models 1 and 2 from Table 25 
become the base regressions in all subsample estimations by region and income that 
follow. 
                                            
27 This comparison is a key discovery from Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and provides 
evidence for economic explanatory power in civil war, instead of the common grievance-
related explanations for conﬂict. 
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The banking crisis dummy variable should not signiﬁcantly predict the onset of 
civil war in the current period, but it predicts civil war 5 years after the crisis incidence. 
The interpretation of the crisis coefficient in Table 25 Model 4 is the log odds of civil war 
risk – the predicted probability of civil war due to a financial crisis in an average country 
is 1.8 percent.  
For the case of Indonesia and Guinea-Bissau, in Figures 1 and 2, the severity of 
the banking crisis may also play a role in the probability of civil war. The severity of a 
financial crisis determines the decline in consumer wealth, economic opportunities, and 
government budgets. In Table 25 Model 5, this 5-year lagged variable, along with 
deposits to GDP, is significant at the 10 percent level. The greater the ﬁnancial crisis, 
the larger the decline in GDP, and the higher the probability of war’s onset28. The fewer 
deposits a bank has on reserve as assets, the greater the probability of war as 
consumers distrust the bank’s ability to hold their wealth and governments buy out 
insolvent banks and depreciated assets. 
During this 5 year period, the government is typically heavily indebted. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009) explain that “on average, government debt rises by 86 [percent] 
during the three years following a banking crisis”. If we consider highly-indebted poor 
countries, 25 percent are conﬂict affected and most of these are in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Therefore, I divide the sample by continent and analyze the continents where most civil 
wars occur: Africa and Asia. 
 
                                            
28 See discussion of highly-indebted poor countries and low income countries for a more 
in-depth analysis. 
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2.10.4 Civil war’s onset in Africa 
We suspect that African or Asian economies are driving the 4 to 5 year 
signiﬁcance of the crisis variable in the entire sample. After all, from the civil wars listed 
in Tables 34 through 36, developed countries that experience a ﬁnancial crisis do not 
usually experience a civil war afterward. Table 26 Model 1 shows that very few of the 
independent variables significantly contribute to the risk of civil war in Africa. I drop 
insignificant variables in Model 2 and settle on Model 3: population, GDP growth and 
democracy are important African indicators of war.  
From Model 4 in Table 26, adding a systemic banking crisis dummy variable 
significantly predicts the onset of civil war in Africa 5 years after the crisis event. The 
risk of conﬂict in an average African country increases to 3.6 percent; however, this 
crisis variable should be considered in conjunction with other independent variables. For 
example, we will see that if a financial crisis predicts civil war and the country has an 
ethnic majority, the probability of conflict increases substantially. 
The severity of such systemic banking crises is also important in Africa29. If a 
banking crisis is associated with steep declines in GDP, this raises the probability of civil 
war in proportion to the size of crisis according to economic theories of conflict.  
2.10.5 Civil war’s onset in Asia 
Asian countries, in contrast to Africa, are affected more quickly by systemic 
banking crises. In Table 27 Models 1 and 2, several independent variables 
insignificantly explain conflict’s onset and are dropped. Model 3 includes GDP per 
                                            
29 However, crisis severity is not important in Asia in terms of civil war risk. 
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capita, GDP growth and population as significant predictors of war risk.  In Model 4, the 
current period financial crisis has no effect, but a ﬁnancial crisis can increase the risk of 
civil war by 5.6 percent over a time span of 2 years.  
From Models 6 and 7 in Table 27, declines in capital formation play a greater role 
in Asia than Africa30. The predicted probabilities of conflict change depending on the 
range of capital formation as a percent of GDP the country currently experiences. For 
instance, an average country with 0 to 10 percent capital formation significantly 
increases war risk by 5.6 percent. With 10 to 20 percent capital formation, there is a 3.3 
percent probability of war and from 20 to 30 percent capital formation there is a 2 
percent chance of conflict. These probabilities of conflict can be taken in tandem with 
financial crises: civil war’s risk increases from 5.6 to 15 percent, 3.3 to 9.5 percent, and 
from 2 to 5.9 percent over the previously mentioned intervals of capital formation. Each 
variable’s contribution to the onset of war must be considered with other significant 
predictors in order to find the total probability of war beginning. 
2.10.6 Civil war for government control and over local issues 
The economic explanations for conﬂict deal with falling opportunity costs and loss 
of wealth. The well-known losses to wealth and employment during and after a ﬁnancial 
crisis seem to contribute to the risk of conﬂict in a country. However, it is not clear what 
type of conﬂict arises from ﬁnancial losses - a war for government control or simply a 
war over local issues? Tables 28 and 29 display the results for the onset of both types 
of wars and includes ﬁnancial crisis variables. 
                                            
30 However, bank deposits to GDP are important predictors of war’s onset in Africa. 
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In Table 28, a war for government control is motivated by low GDP per capita 
and GDP growth, the extent to which government policy represents the will of the 
people, and the number of years the state has peacefully governed. Ethnic diversity and 
population size play no role in motivating war for government control. A systemic 
banking crisis which occurs concurrently with civil war does not explain the war’s onset. 
However, 5 years after the incidence of ﬁnancial crisis the risk of civil war for 
government control becomes 0.96 percent. 
Governance variables like political constraints, levels of democracy, and regime 
stability are very important determinants for a civil war for government control. However, 
they are important to the extent that they inﬂuence income per capita and growth. 
Grievances are fueled when an opposition party has no inﬂuence on government policy. 
A government at risk of being usurped offers shorter periods of peace and 
homogeneous government representation. 
Civil wars fought over local issues, in Table 29, have different determinants than 
wars fought for government control. Population size and GDP growth are strong 
determinants for wars involving local issues. Governance does not play any role in 
these wars except to the extent that a government prevented such wars from occurring 
in the past. Such wars may also be more spontaneous and involve less planning than a 
government takeover. In any case, a systemic banking crisis precedes wars over local 
issues by 2 years and the probability of civil war for local issues is 0.4 percent. 
2.10.7 Civil war in highly-indebted poor countries (HIPC) 
If government spending and debt play a role in the onset of civil war, perhaps the 
highly-indebted poor countries are at more risk of civil war than countries with low 
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income. If civil war happens more frequently as a result of ﬁnancial crises in the 
indebted countries, then the probability of war in the HIPC subsample will be larger. 
First, in Table 30 Models 1 and 2, the other explanatory variables explain the 
onset of civil war poorly due to few observations in the fuel exportation variable and less 
explanatory power of population and governance variables. In Model 2, dropping the 
fuel exportation variable yields just over 1,000 observations; in Model 3, the GDP per 
capita level, GDP growth, maintaining an ethnic majority, and democracy explain the 
onset of war signiﬁcantly in highly-indebted poor countries. From this base regression 
an analysis of ﬁnancial crisis’ role takes place. 
From Table 30 Models 4 and 5, the coefficient on the banking crisis dummy is 
1.30 in HIPC as opposed to 0.61 in the entire sample and 0.96 in Africa for the 5-year 
lag and 1.32 in Asia for the 2-year lag. Highly-indebted poor countries share with Asia 
the greatest risk of civil war resulting from the incidence of ﬁnancial crisis. This link 
between indebted countries and civil war has received little attention in the conﬂict 
literature. 
To strengthen the debt connection with civil war, I compare a sample of low-
income countries to the highly-indebted poor countries. Ethnic dominance, GDP growth 
and democracy are significant determinants of civil war in both low income and highly-
indebted poor countries. I compare the financial crisis dummy and crisis severity 
variables to find that the risk of conflict following an incidence of financial crisis is higher 
in the indebted poor countries. However, the severity of a financial crisis more 
significantly determines civil war’s onset in low-income countries. If a low-income 
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country also has an ethnic majority, the predicted probabilities of war more than double 
in some cases. 
2.10.8 Civil war and hyperinflation 
Another financial event that erodes consumer wealth and decreases the 
opportunity costs of joining a rebellion is hyperinflation. The connection between war, 
international and civil war, and hyperinflation is easily seen after World War I and II in 
Hungary, other post-WWII European countries, and African countries in the 1990s 
during the African World War. Hyperinflation occurs after large, international wars, but 
an argument can be made that it starts civil wars as well.  
I collect the base regressions from each subsample in Table 33 and include the 
hyperinflation dummy variable which is constructed identically to the financial crisis 
variable (It takes the value of 1 for every year in which prices increase, even for a short 
time period, more than 50 percent). Hyperinflation has no significant effect in the entire 
sample simply due to its rare occurrence.  
However, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola have instances of 
reoccurring and prolonged hyperinflation in the 1990s. These significant events drive 
the estimation results in Africa (Table 33 Model 2) and yield the largest coefficient in 
civil war’s risk yet, 2.25, which are log odds of the outcome of war. These were wars for 
government control and only the Democratic Republic of Congo is a highly-indebted 
poor country. 
2.11 Conclusion 
This paper builds upon the previous economic models of conﬂict proposed by 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) by including systemic banking crisis and ﬁnancial variables 
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associated with crisis. The event of ﬁnancial crisis decreases personal wealth and 
therefore the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion. It also depletes a government’s 
budget through purchases of non-performing loans and protecting banks from 
insolvency. This implies a tradeoff with spending on services, infrastructure, and 
monetary concessions to rebel groups. The indebted government becomes weak and 
ripe for rebel takeover. 
I showed this through panel-time series logit estimation of the onset of conﬂict 
with economic and political variables common in the conﬂict literature and ﬁnancial 
variables. A systemic banking crisis increases the chance of civil war in 2 and 5 years 
by between 3.6 and 5.6 percent in Asian and African economies. Civil wars develop 
more quickly as a result of ﬁnancial conditions in Asia than in Africa. A civil war for 
government control is preceded by a ﬁnancial crisis within 5 years and civil war over 
local issues is preceded by crisis within 2 years of its onset. 
By comparing low-income and highly-indebted poor countries, evidence arises 
for the role of strong governance in preventing civil wars. A government in debt due to 
ﬁnancial crisis faces a spending tradeoff between supporting insolvent banks and 
providing services for its citizens that improve well-being. Strong ﬁnancial institutions in 
which people store their wealth are also important. When people do not deposit their 
money into banks, they are insecure about their expected future wealth and this 
increases the risk of civil uprising. If the government cannot insure a stable environment 
for capital to accrue, the risk of conﬂict also rises. 
The probability of civil war increases substantially in low-income countries when 
controlling for other conditions like an ethnic majority with financial crises. This suggests 
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that to practically consider a country’s risk for civil war, all significant variables must be 
taken into account and not just the probability associated with a single financial crisis 
event (ceteris paribus). 
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Figure 4: Severe banking crises in Indonesia and civil war's onset 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Severe banking crises in Guinea-Bissau and civil war's onset 
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Table 22: Civil war's onset 
 
 
 
Table 23: Opportunity model: Random-effects logistic regression for civil war's 
onset 1970-2007 
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Table 24: Grievance model: Random-effects logistic regression for civil war's 
onset 1970-2007 
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Table 25: Combined model: Random-effects logistic regression for civil war's 
onset 1970-2007 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
Table 26: African model for civil war's onset 1970-2007 
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Table 27: Asian model for civil war's onset 1970-2007 
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Table 28: Onset of civil war for government control 1970-2007 
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Table 29: Onset of civil war fought over local issues 1970-2007 
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Table 30: HIPC model for civil war's onset 1970-2007 
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Table 31: PRIO combined model: Random-effects logistic regression for civil 
war's onset 1970-2007 
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Table 32: Penn World Tables combined model: Random-effects logistic 
regression for civil war's onset 1970-2007 
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Table 33: Hyperinflation and civil war's onset 1970-2007 
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Table 34: African banking crises and civil war 1970-2007 
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Table 35: Asian banking crises and civil war 1970-2007 
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Table 36: All other banking crises and civil war 1970-2007 
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CHAPTER 3 
CIVIL WAR SEVERITY AND THE ECONOMY 
3.1 Introduction 
Studying the determinants of war’s severity has practical importance in terms of 
government policy decisions and their implications for future economic growth. If the 
effects of war can be ameliorated through decisive government action, then this seems 
to be a beneficial option for all parties involved. The economic theories of conflict 
revolve around opportunity costs associated with rebellion such that when the 
opportunity cost of joining a rebellion is sufficiently low, then the potential rebel has 
economic incentive to cause strife. Therefore, if the opportunity costs of war rise 
through the effect of development assistance and aid, employment, and stable prices, 
then people will abstain from conflict activities and the effects of war will be less severe. 
This paper addresses the question of what drives the severity of civil war and 
what policy decisions may be taken to ameliorate the detrimental effects of war. 
Severity is measured by average civil war battle deaths per year and determined 
according to political and economic variables commonly associated with conflict such as 
aid, unemployment, and hyperinflation. Lacina (2006) uses civil war duration, but does 
not account for endogeneity with civil war severity. Therefore, the main estimation 
procedure of this paper is generalized method of moment estimation with an 
instrumental variable to account for the endogeneity of civil war's duration in 
determining war's severity. Economic variables associated with war such as aid, 
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unemployment, and hyperinflation are included as explanatory variables and provide a 
basis for government policy decisions during the civil war. 
The economic theories of civil war outlined in Collier and Hoeffler (2004) are 
critical in understanding the contribution of this paper.  Opportunity costs, diminishing 
wealth, and potential benefits of looting explain the motivations for civil strife. The first 
estimation of civil war's severity from Lacina (2006) involves ordinary least squares 
regression techniques that find civil war's duration, the end of the cold war, levels of 
democracy, and ethnic polarization to be significant predictors of a civil war's severity. 
However, the duration of war and its severity may endogenously determine one 
another31. Another issue which is not addressed in Lacina (2006) is the time-varying 
nature of civil war's severity. 
This paper explains the severity of war in economic terms by analyzing the effect 
of aid, unemployment and hyperinflation. These variables have often been associated 
with war, but they've never explicitly been used to determine the severity of war. This 
paper considers a panel time-series estimation with instrumental variables instead of 
the first proposed ordinary least squares. This estimation captures annual changes in 
war severity by country and controls for a possible endogeneity problem with the 
                                            
31 Also, in practical terms, government policy which shortens a war will also make it less 
severe which leads to the question of what can shorten a civil war? Or how can a 
government become more democratic? The answer may be the civil war itself which 
cannot help diminish war severity. 
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duration of war. Concluding remarks suggest possible government policy for a practical 
amelioration of severe conflict. 
The literature related to civil war's severity is first summarized with attention to 
motivations behind the inclusion of certain variables. The construction of severity is then 
explained and followed by a description of the predictors of these average annual battle 
deaths. The model and results using IV/GMM estimation precedes the conclusion which 
entails a short description of possible government policy to decrease a civil war's 
severity. 
3.2 Literature review 
3.2.1 Conflict literature related to civil war’s severity 
The summary of literature related to civil war's severity is relatively short (Lacina 
and Gleditsch, 2005) in comparison to civil war's duration and onset, but the point of 
departure must be Lacina (2006). Lacina (2006) estimates state-based armed conflicts 
as specified from the Uppsala/PRIO database with ordinary least squares. In this 
research each conflict occurrence and the related battle deaths exist as single data 
points which amount to at most 114 observations. However, the severity of war may 
change over time with the introduction of international participants, new sources of 
government wealth, and changes to the economic well-being of active participants. 
Civil war's severity can be measured in different contexts such as conventional 
and irregular warfare in Balcells and Kalyvas (2014). Here they suggest the "technology 
of rebellion" is important as civil war is not only a political contest, but a military contest 
as well. One important takeaway from Balcells and Kalyvas (2014) is their measure of 
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average battle deaths per month which suggests that averaging battle deaths is a valid 
tool for understanding conflict's severity.32 
The onset and severity of conflict can be estimated together since they "are 
distinct but interconnected decisions and should be estimated as such" (Ritter 2014). In 
Ritter (2014) a relationship between political survival and repression and dissent is 
estimated using Tobit regression techniques. She finds that a secure leader is likely to 
pursue peaceful governance until conflict begins and the governing leader escalates 
conflict along with the rebel party - thus increasing conflict's severity. In any case, the 
inter-relationship between conflict's onset and severity is central to this paper's 
proposed estimation model. 
3.2.2 The relationship between unemployment and civil war 
Several development factors influence the motivations for war such as growth, 
infant mortality, and unemployment Buhaug and Lujala (2013). However, Buhaug and 
Lujala (2013) suggest that such aspects "should be measured at a sub-national level" 
since data organized by country cannot approximate conflict zones as accurately. They 
address this problem, but if a civil war is sufficiently severe, then changes in 
unemployment will be noticeable with country-level data which is used in this paper. 
Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) explain the cumulative nature of "poverty, 
unemployment, land pressures, [an] inadequate tax base, [a] lack of education, and 
insufficient or unavailable human skills" which operate as government constraints to 
                                            
32 A monthly specification of conflict's duration is common using survival analysis. 
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regulation and social compliance. This government weakness to resolve such issues 
"heightens insecurity" (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001). Unemployment 
contributes to this insecurity although it is often absent in typical estimations of civil war 
due to the reasons listed previously. 
3.2.3 The role of debt and aid in civil war 
Debt relief can play a crucial role in addressing "past neglect and discrimination" 
as inequality in government spending can cause social grievances (Addison and 
Murshed, 2003). Highly-indebted poor countries have weak social contracts such that a 
collapse of the contract and ensuing civil war will be related to "favouritism in public 
spending" and unjust taxation (Addison and Murshed, 2003). The effects of debt relief 
and development aid, our variable of interest, are strongly positive during and after a 
civil war.33 
3.3 Civil war deaths 
The severity of war in Lacina (2006) is measured by the number of combatant 
and civilian battle deaths incurred by both sides in a given year. In a time series 
regression, the battle deaths must be recorded for each year in a meaningful way. The 
Correlates of War database records the total number of combatant battle deaths for 
both sides over the course of the civil war, not the deaths incurred per year. Given this 
                                            
33 However, aid and debt relief in general to African countries has been suggested to 
have a negative eﬀect on development in Kanbur (2000) and food aid from the U.S. 
may have a positive eﬀect on the incidence, onset and duration of civil war in Nunn and 
Qian (2011). 
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method of data collection, and the fact that regression analysis reports coefficients for 
an average country in an average year, it makes sense to use average battle deaths34. 
The years without battle deaths receive a “0” and the years of civil war in which 
no reliable record of battle deaths are available are excluded from the dataset. We 
cannot simply give a zero value when deaths had almost certainly occurred, nor can we 
give an average amount of battle deaths if the actual number may be much more or 
much less. Therefore, we simply exclude these combatant deaths from the sample. 
The Correlates of War codebook35 describes these occasions as “data unknown” 
or “not applicable” which means the total amount of battle deaths are unknown or there 
were no battle deaths for one side. The Intra-state war database records wars that take 
place “within the recognized territory of a state” and “the war must involve sustained 
combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-
related combatant fatalities within a twelve month period” 
(http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war/intra-state-war-data-codebook). 
3.4 Predictors of civil war’s severity 
 3.4.1 Civil war’s duration 
 Civil war’s duration (see Table 1) is measured as the cumulative number of years 
in which a country has experienced civil war. Civil war duration measured in Lacina 
                                            
34 See Table 37 on p. 105 with the civil war severity variable defined as average battle 
deaths. 
35 The intra-state wars codebook can be found at: http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-
sets/COW-war/intra-state-war-data-codebook. 
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(2006) is simply the length of a civil war – an appropriate specification for ordinary least 
squares, but data organized in a panel time-series fashion should measure duration 
differently. For instance, in Collier et al. (2004), duration is measured as a dummy 
variable in monthly survival analysis. The goal of my estimation is to find the effect of 
increasing number of years engaged in civil war and my specification in Table 1 aims to 
find this effect. 
Fearon (2004) explains civil war duration using a game theoretic model of 
credible commitments that suggest that settlement is more likely when the government’s 
army is strong.” Therefore, I test military strength as an instrument to control for 
endogeneity in civil war’s duration and severity. However, Fearon (2004) explains that 
there is no agreed upon set up determinants for civil war’s duration, but democracy and 
military strength seem to be related to duration.  
3.4.2 Regime durability 
The duration of peace between civil wars has been an explanatory variable in 
previous conﬂict models36 and regime durability measures the number of years since a 
change in regime (government). The change in government is indicated by a 0 and 
every year that follows receives a value of 1 until the next regime change. The regime 
change is determined by the polity scale in a year for which the country becomes 
substantially more democratic or autocratic (+/- 3 points). 
                                            
36 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
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3.4.3 Fuel exports (percent of merchandise exports) 
Countries that have more exports comprised of oil, diamonds, and other natural 
resources are at higher risk for civil war since the acquisition of such goods can be 
ﬁnancially lucrative. A government can also extract high rents from the production and 
exportation of oil thus increasing the beneﬁt of civil war for government control. Collier 
(2004) explains that grievances play a role in recruitment of rebels, but sometimes the 
underlying reasons for civil unrest are economic. 
Fearon (2005) argues that the inclusion of primary commodity exports in Collier 
(2004) may capture a real driver of conﬂict which is oil exportation. The oil exportation 
variable presented in this paper is fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise exports 
from the World Development Indicators 2013 database37. It is positively correlated with 
the onset of civil war. When fuel exports comprise a large percentage of exports, the 
probability of conﬂict is higher. 
3.4.4 Hyperinﬂation 
Steve Hanke and Nicholas Krus are economists at the Johns Hopkins University 
and they’ve collected 56 instances of hyperinﬂation dating back to the French 
Revolution in 1795. The exchange rate between two countries is key to identifying 
hyperinﬂation. Hanke explains, “the ratio of the price level between two countries is 
equivalent to their exchange rate”. If one country experiences hyperinﬂation, then the 
                                            
37 This variable is also similar to primary commodity exports used in Reynal-Querol 
(2002). 
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exchange rate with another country changes drastically. Two trading partners can 
therefore both eventually experience hyperinﬂation as rising prices “travel” through 
trade. 
Most of the hyperinﬂation data is in terms of consumer prices since they “best 
reﬂect price changes experienced by the ﬁnal consumer”. Hanke deﬁnes hyperinﬂation 
according to Cagan (1956) which is a monthly inﬂation rate greater than 50 percent. 
Both civil and international war are also associated with hyperinﬂation. Hanke 
explains, “Hyperinﬂation is an economic malady that arises under extreme conditions: 
war, political mismanagement, and the transition from a command to market-based 
economy – to name a few.”38 A regime change, for instance due to a successful rebel 
overthrow of government, can change the structure of government and therefore also 
the economy. 
3.4.5 Systemic banking crises 
In the midst of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, two researchers from the International 
Monetary Fund prepared a database on systemic banking crises with a focus on the 
timing and type of crisis. The ﬁnancial crisis variable comes from Valencia and Laeven 
(2008) and identiﬁes the start and end of 42 banking crises. 
I’ve identiﬁed these banking crises with a dummy variable taking the value of 1 at 
the onset of crisis and every year during the crisis. The years for which no banking crisis 
                                            
38 http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/ﬁles/pubs/pdf/workingpaper-8.pdf 
97 
 
 
occurred receive a value of 0. This variable identiﬁes the onset and duration of ﬁnancial 
crises associated with banking. 
The timing of a banking crisis is determined by the amount of non-performing 
loans as a percentage of total loans, gross ﬁscal costs and output loss as a percentage 
of GDP, and minimum real GDP growth. The researchers cross-check the crisis dates 
with the timing of deposit runs, deposit freezes, liquidity support, and bank interventions 
(Valencia and Laeven, 2008). This variable is positively correlated with civil war. 
Demand deposits and capital formation as a percentage of GDP, along with real 
GDP growth are also described below as they are signiﬁcant predictors of the onset of 
civil war in addition to ﬁnancial crisis. Many conditions requisite for ﬁnancial crisis are 
also shared by civil war due to the relative decrease in opportunity costs of rebellion and 
relative increase in beneﬁts through stolen commodities, rents on those commodities, or 
government control and appropriation of wealth. 
3.4.6 Military quality 
A measure of state capacity to engage in counterinsurgency, military quality, is 
deﬁned as military expenditure divided by the number of armed personnel. Both military 
expenditure and armed personnel variables come from the World Development 
Indicators 2013 dataset. A less severe war will involve a highly-trained military with 
multiple resources at its disposal to suppress a rebel threat with minimal violence. This 
variable is expected to be negatively correlated with the number of battle deaths, a 
measure of war severity. 
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3.4.7 Religious Fractionalization 
There is some theory and less empirical evidence that religious divisions among 
a society will cause rebellion and conﬂict (Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002); Ellingsen 
(2000); Reynal-Querol (2002). From Lacina’s work on civil war severity, religious 
diﬀerences do not signiﬁcantly predict more violent wars. However, there has been 
some evidence on the role of religion in economic growth (Barro and McCleary, 2003) 
and conﬂict (Reynal-Querol, 2002) and the model in Lacina (2006) can be improved 
upon with the addition of certain variables. 
The measure of religious fractionalization is similar to ethnic fractionalization – 
the scale from 0 to 1 reﬂects the probability of selecting two random people from the 
same religious group in a population. Empirical studies of conﬂict suggest that greater 
religious diversity equates to less conﬂict. This variable typically has a positive 
relationship to civil war. 
3.4.8 Political Terror – U.S. State Department 
This measure of terror from Teorell, Dahlberg, Holmberg, Rothstein, Hartmann 
and Svensson (2015) does not take into account personal actors pursuing their own 
ideological agenda apart from the state, i.e. Islamic terrorism in the West, but measures 
political repression by a government. An example is a government leader murdering a 
political opponent or detaining a political dissident indeﬁnitely. 
The political terror index measures the power government has to oppress or 
eliminate its citizens. A government which is not bound by human rights laws can more 
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easily kill civilians and rebels that cause political trouble. The index is scaled from 1 to 5 
indicating the following: 
5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these 
societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they 
pursue personal or ideological goals. 
4:  Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the 
population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of 
life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror aﬀects those who interest 
themselves in politics or ideas. 
3:  There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such 
imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be 
common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is 
accepted. 
2:  There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. 
However, few persons are aﬀected, torture and beatings are exceptional. 
Political murder is rare. 
1:  Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their 
view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely 
rare. 
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3.5 Building a model of civil war’s severity 
In considering a large sample of countries, a more detailed analysis of factors 
occurring before a civil war is possible. For instance, it has been suggested that 
recessions can spur a rebellion by lowering the opportunity costs associated with joining 
war (Blomberg 2002). These economic recessions, and their wealth diminishing 
characteristics, occur before a civil war and may contribute to the severity of war. Thus 
a time-series regression can capture conditions before the onset of war which contribute 
to the severity of a civil war. 
Each country also has its own speciﬁc starting level of GDP and population which 
suggests some usefulness in panel estimation. It’s not clear why battle deaths, 
population, and GDP are logged in Lacina’s estimations; however, the reason may be 
due to the inherent diﬀerences in levels of those variables within each country. A panel 
estimation can account for this variation and allow the use of actual levels of battle 
deaths, population and GDP. This estimation is useful in determining the contribution of 
each variable to civil war’s severity - it is simply easier to understand practically the 
coeﬃcients of non-logged variables. 
One of the highly signiﬁcant predictors of civil war severity in Lacina (2006) is the 
duration of conﬂict. The reason for this, presumably, is that longer civil wars result in 
more battle-related deaths. However, it can also easily be argued that more battle-
related deaths result in longer civil wars. Deaths due to a civil war can fuel grievances 
as rebel leaders are martyred or potential rebels witness the deaths of family and 
friends and join the rebellion. Therefore, endogeneity may be a problem in the ordinary 
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least squares regressions in Lacina (2006). To account for such endogeneity, I estimate 
using instrumental variables in a generalized method of moment (IV/GMM) regression 
framework. 
IV/GMM estimation allows the researcher to control for the endogeneity of one 
independent variable by instrumenting with another variable which shares a strong 
positive or negative relationship. This instrument should also have very little relationship 
with the dependent variable. (What is my instrument and for which variable?) Therefore, 
the model I propose is a panel time-series estimation using IV/GMM. 
Some contention may arise using these methods with a data set that includes 
times of peace, i.e. no battle deaths. Since the dependent variable contains not only 
battle deaths, but zero battle deaths, we’re also measuring the onset of civil war. 
Therefore, it makes sense that some of the variables which predict the onset of war will 
also predict the severity of war simply due to the setup of this model. 
3.6 Estimating civil war’s severity 
The original regressions of conﬂict variables with log battle deaths from Lacina 
(2006) in Table 1 Models 1 and 4 reveal that longer wars, wars after 1990, wars in non-
democratic nations, and wars in ethnically homogeneous countries are more severe. 
From Chapter 2, ﬁnancial crises and hyperinﬂation increase the risk of civil war for 
reasons of economic opportunity; however, perhaps such wars are also more severe for 
similar economic reasons. 
Therefore, I include dummy variables of ﬁnancial crisis and hyperinﬂation when 
such events occur concurrently with the civil war or within ﬁve years previous of war’s 
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onset. The previous paper explained that the eﬀects ﬁnancial crises and hyperinﬂation 
may not be felt immediately, but compound over time. Thus wars associated with these 
economic events may be more severe and even last longer. 
The hyperinﬂation variable enters into the OLS regressions signiﬁcantly in Table 
1 Models 2 and 5 and predict more severe wars. Financial crises do not signiﬁcantly 
explain the severity of civil wars, but this may be due to the time span of the dataset 
from 1946 to 2002. Financial crises became more prevalent in the 1990s and 2000s and 
the dataset of ﬁnancial crises only goes back to 1970. Therefore, several years of civil 
war which may be associated with ﬁnancial crises are not included in the estimation. 
Therefore, to more fully capture the annual eﬀects of economic events, I estimate 
a panel time-series model of battle deaths using generalized method of moments with 
instrumental variables in Table 2. In Table 2 Model 1, variables commonly used to 
measure civil war’s onset, along with variables proposed by Lacina (2006) like military 
quality and civil war’s duration are estimated. The base model from which we add new 
economic variables is Model 2 in Table 2. Population does in fact matter, along with the 
number of years a government has sustained peace, GDP growth in the country, civil 
war’s duration, and political terror committed by the state. 
3.7 Conclusion 
By estimating the severity of civil war in a country-year framework, we can 
determine short-run eﬀects of unemployment, ﬁnancial crisis, hyperinﬂation, and foreign 
aid during a civil war. Unemployment increases the severity of civil war as rebels are 
recruited from the pool of unemployed workers. Foreign aid has a negative eﬀect on the 
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severity of war and explains the economic impact of outside help. A ﬁnancial crisis 
results in relatively fewer battle deaths and hyperinﬂation has a signiﬁcant, positive 
eﬀect on battle deaths in civil war - roughly 387 more deaths with hyperinﬂation than 
without on average. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
 
Table 37: Civil war severity 
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Table 38: OLS regressions of battle deaths in civil conflicts 1946-2002 
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Table 39: IV/GMM regressions of battle deaths in civil conflicts 
 
 
 
 
107 
 
 
Table 40: IV/GMM regressions of battle deaths in civil conflicts 
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Table 41: IV/GMM regressions of battle deaths in civil conflicts - alternative 
model without economic variables 
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Table 42: IV/GMM regressions of battle deaths in civil conflicts - instrumenting 
war duration 
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